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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with answering the following 
question: What is phenomenological realism? I have tried to 
accomplish this, in part, by looking at the history of 
phenomenological realism. However, it is not sufficient to 
look at the history of this movement if we are to 
understand what it is today. Thus, I have tried to present 
the reader with the attitude, methods, and the ontological 
and epistemological foundations of phenomenological 
realism, both in some of their early formulations and in 
their later, more refined forms. While many 
phenomenological realists differ with regards to certain 
issues, I think that there exists much agreement concerning 
these basic aspects of the philosophy. 
I have tried to present these foundational aspects of 
phenomenological realism using the following outline. 
Chapter one concerns itself _with phenomenological realism 
as a twentieth century philosophy. I mention the leading 
figures of this movement, both in the Munich and Goettingen 
Circles, and I use the works of Adolf Reinach and Dietrich 
von Hildebrand in order to demonstrate the attitude which 
is at the heart of this philosophy. I then proceed, in 
ii 
chapter two, to present the ways in which Plato ' s writings 
implicitly contain many of the notions which are vital to 
phenomenological realism. In chapter three I argue that the 
term ' phenomenological realism ' does not accurately 
describe this philsophy and suggest that the term which 
Fritz Wenisch has proposed, 'chreontic philosophy,' more 
accurately decribes this movement. I then present three 
examples of how the attitude and methods of chreontic 
philosophy have been used to uncover certain features of 
reality. Finally, I conclude with responses to three 
objections concerning insight and the existence of genuine 
essences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Phenomenological realism , unlike many modern schools 
of thought , has concerned itself with pursuing eternal , 
changeless, and absolutely certain truths. It is a 
philosophy which shares much in common with classical 
philosophy, particularly with regard to the Platonic not i on 
of intuition into genuine essences. Nevertheless , one of 
the most distinguishing marks of the philosophers who have 
worked within this tradition is their keen awareness of the 
methods and objects of philosophy , an awareness which was 
often lacking among the ancients. 
This thesis aims at answering the following question: 
What is phenomenological realism? In part , I have sought to 
answer this question by examining the historical roots of 
this philosophy, however, this thesis is not a history of 
phenomenological realism . My main concern is with 
presenting the attitude, methods, and the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of this philosophy. 
Historically, I am only interested in tracing the 
development of these foundations. A thorough history of 
phenomenological realism would include a look at the 
writings of Alexander Pfaender, Edith Stein , Hedwig 
Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, Moritz Geiger , and most of 
t 
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all Husserl ' s Logical Investigations. Husserl is 
unquestionably seen as the ' Father of Phenomenology; ' 
however, the philosophy about which I am writing has very 
little in common with what most people associate with 
Husserl's phenomenology. 
While it is widely debated, I hold that Husserl 
abandoned his commitment to true phenomenology when he 
turned from realism to a transcendental idealism. However, 
I wish to avoid this dispute completely. One of the best 
expositions of the view that Husserl made a turn from 
realism to idealism can be found in Josef Seifert ' s Back 
to Things in Themselves and I would strongly recommend its 
reading to anyone interested in phenomenological realism.1 
We find the following passages in von Hildebrand's 
What is Philosophy?. Referring to phenomenology, he 
states that it is: 
the approach which is at the basis of every great 
philosophical discovery, whether found in Plato's 
Meno, Aristotle's Organon, or in the 'Si fallor, 
sum' argument of St. Augustine.2 
Thus, phenomenology seems not to be something new. 
And yet, because former philosophers used this 
arch-method of philosophy only occasionally, and 
always unsystematically, without being conscious of 
it as a method, we may say that phenomenology is new 
and even revolutionary.3 
What is this arch-method of philosophy which is in 
some ways classical and in other ways new? In order to 
answer this question I will devote the first chapter to 
phenomenological realism as a twentieth century philosophy, 
and the second chapter to phenomenological realism as an 
l 
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ancient philosophy--specifically, a form of refined 
Platonism. 
After looking at phenomenological realism as both a 
twentieth century and an ancient philosophy, I will 
consider the name 'phenomenological realism' and evaluate 
whether it accurately describes this kind of philosophy. 
I will then turn to the writings of Reinach, Scheler, 
and von Hildebrand in order to demonstrate how the attitude 
and methods of phenomenological realism have been used to 
'uncover' reality. Specifically, we will look at sections 
of Reinach's Apriori Foundations of Civil Law, Scheler's 
Ressentiment, and von Hildebrand's theory of the person 
as found in his book entitled The Heart. 
Finally, I shall respond to three objections which 
have been raised concerning the method of insight and the 
existence of genuine essences. In such a fashion I hope to 
delineate the roots and method of phenomenological 
realism. 
t 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM: A TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 
Phenomenological realism finds its earliest 
presentation in Husserl's Logical Investigations; a piece 
of writing which was wholly devoid of the idealist and 
subjectivistic notions which are found throughout his later 
phenomenological works. "In fact," writes von Hildebrand 
about the Logical Investigations, "the historical impact 
of this work of Husserl, attracting students of all 
countries to Goettingen, was due to its unambiguous 
refutation of psychologism, subjectivism, and all types of 
relativism."4 
While this work of Husserl may have started the wheel 
turning, · it seems that phenomenology grew as a philosophy 
through the seminal discussions and debates which were 
regularly held by members of two philosophical circles: the 
Munich Circle and the later Goettingen Circle. While 
Goettingen eventually became the famed phenomenological 
circle, Herbert Spiegelberg says of the Munich group that: 
its beginnings reach back even before that of the 
Goettingen group, and its importance for the 
development of the Movement was at one time perhaps 
even greater. It also continued for a longer period, 
without rifts, shifts, and defections which marked the 
the history of Husserl's immediate following in 
Goettingen and later in Freiburg."5 
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It is this Munich Circle which is identified as the center 
of early phenomenology and which provided the first fruits 
of the type of philosophy which is the focus of this 
thesis. 
Originally formed around Theodor Lipps ' descriptive 
psychology, the Munich Circle was soon converted to the 
philosophy of Husserl ' s Logical Investigations after 
Lipps tried unsuccessfully to defend his psychologism 
against Husserl ' s refutations. Its members included 
Alexander Pfaender and Johannes Daubert as early leaders, 
Adolf Reinach, Theodor Conrad, Max Scheler and "among the 
younger Scheler-inspired members Dietrich von Hildebrand 
was the most prominent."6 
Herbert Spiegelberg tells us that besides being more 
gregarious and meeting more frequently than the Goettingen 
Circle, "the most distinguishing characteristic of the 
Munich Circle was the primary interest in analytic and 
descriptive psychology, and, partly under the influence of 
the genius loci of the art city Munich, a stronger interest 
in problems of value and of esthetics than was found in the 
more austere mathematical and scientific climate of 
Goettingen."7 It is interesting to note that while today we 
find a clear, and sometimes hostile rift between 
'continental' and 'analytic ' philosophers, no such rift was 
to be found in the early days of phenomenology. This 
tendency of the Munich Circle to combine both the analytic 
and the descpriptive method in their psychology has not 
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been lost in the development of realist phenomenology. 
A futher note which should be made concerning the 
early circle of phenomenolgy is that the Munich and 
Goettingen circles were not even remotely closed. Much 
interaction between the two was to be found. In fact, in 
his history of the phenomenological movement Spiegelberg 
tells us that the later Goettingen Circle was led by many 
of the earlier Munich philosophers. Among them he includes 
Adolf Reinach, Johannes Daubert, Theodor Conrad and 
Dietrich van Hildebrand. To these were later added Edith 
Stein, Roman Ingarden, Hedwig Conrad-Martius and eventually 
Max Scheler. Giving further evidence to the fact that 
realist phenomenology was soon abandoned by, or perhaps 
never fully grasped by Husserl, Spiegelberg states that: 
About 1907 these students began to form a special 
circle. They used to meet at least once a week for 
discussions and the reading of papers outside the 
lecture halls and seminar rooms, mostly in Husserl's 
absence and, as a matter of fact, with his hardly 
conqealed disapproval. For to this lively group and 
to its varying membership and fringe, phenomenology 
meant something rather different from what it did to 
Husserl at this stage, i.e., not the turn toward 
subjectivity as the basic phenomenological stratum, 
but toward the 'Sachen,' understood in the sense of 
the whole range of phenomenon, and mostly toward the 
objective, not the su~jective ones.B 
And later he adds that "increasingly it was the 
phenomenology of Reinach (who had become Privatdozent in 
1909) which expressed the spirit of the group."9 Thus, 
while realist phenomenology is more frequently associated 
with the Munich Circle, we see that the later Goettingen 
Circle, particularly under the leadership of Adolf Rei~ach, 
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was clearly committed to a realist view; and much to 
Husserl's dismay they did not adhere to his transcendental 
idealism. 
If the early phenomenological circles did not dedicate 
themselves to Husserl's transcendental idealism, what did 
they dedicate themselves to? What was Reinach ' s brand of 
phenomenology? In order to answer this question we will 
take a look at Reinach's article Concerning Phenomenology 
and van Hildebrand's What is Philosophy? 
Reinach begins his discussion of phenomenology by 
telling us that he does not want to talk about 
phenomenology but rather he wants to think in a 
phenomenological manner. He speaks of phenomenology as a 
way of seeing or an attitude. What he is referring to is 
the original maxim of phenomenology coined by Husserl: 
'Back to things themselves'. This attitude is one which 
should be used both inside and outside of the realm of 
philosophy. Exemplifying this attitude, von Hildebrand 
states that the phenomenologist: 
sharply disagrees, therefore, with, say, the 
historian of art who believes that he will attain a 
real knowledge of a work of art, simply by exploring 
all sociological influences on an artist and his 
work, and by minutely analyzing the history of his 
life. He would charge the historian with proceeding 
in a typically non-phenomenological way. On the other 
hand, the one who approaches the work 
phenomenologically concentrates on the very nature of 
the work of art itself, its beauty, its atmosphere, 
and tries to grasp the specific character and 
individuality of this work by an intuitive diving 
into it.10 
In the footnote to this passage von Hildebrand goes on 
r 
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to make an important point concerning the claims of 
certainty which arise from phenomenological 
investigations--claims which are made even in the face of 
widespread disagreement among philosophers. He states that 
it "is a great and widespread error to assume that the 
objectivity and validity of a truth depend upon the fact 
that everyone and anyone can grasp it or that we can prove 
it in such a way that everyone must accept it."11 Thus, the 
fact that this method of intuitively grasping the essence 
of an object presupposes certain capacities within the 
philosopher himself does not render it invalid or even 
insufficient. 
For Reinach, the philosophical method is nothing other 
than this phenomenological way of seeing, this attitude 
which we may assume when we approach objects, an attitude 
which allows us to put aside prejudices and preconcieved 
notions, and then proceed to see the object in itself as it 
most truly is. Further, this method need not be 
epistemologically or metaphysically justified in order to 
be used fruitfully (even though an epistemological 
justification is possible and desirable). In his opening 
paragraph Reinach states that: 
the essential point is this, that phenomenology is 
not a system of philosophical propositions and 
truths--a system in which all who call themselves 
phenomenologists must believe, and which I could 
prove to you--but rather it is a method of 
philosophizing which is required by the problems of 
philosophy. "12 
Perhaps at this point we must distiguish realist 
r 
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phenomenology as a new system from phenomenology as a 
method; for this method has been justified and has produced 
certain truths which have become an essential part of the 
system of realist phenomenology. 
The fact that phenomenological realism has -evolved 
into an ' open system' of philosophy is undeniable. I say an 
' open ' system because it is not a system which claims to be 
complete , nor one which shuns dialogue with other schools 
of thought. But it has become a system. This can most 
clearly be seen when we consider the work which is being 
done in the area of phenomenological realism today. 
The Internationale Akademie fur Philosophie (IAP) in 
Liechtenstein, under the direction of Josef Seifert, has 
become a center of this strai~ of philosophical thought. 
While undoubtedly committed to a phenomenological tradition 
of realism , the openness of realist phenomenology becomes 
especially clear when one considers their list of visiting 
professors which represents thinkers from the most diverse 
areas of philosophy. In America, we find phenomenological 
realism represented by several philosophers at the 
University of Rhode Island, (including the chairman), and 
several others at the Franciscan University of 
Steubenville, (including the Dean of Faculty). All of these 
philosophers combine to form a tight knit circle of 
thinkers who are committed to the phenomenological realism 
of Reinach, Scheler, and especially von Hildebrand. 
In the foreword to the first volume of Aletheia, 
) 
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the IAP's international journal of philosophy, we find 
Seifert speaking for r~alist phenomenology as a whole when 
he says, "We want to grasp reality in its various 
connections and in its unity, to the extent that this is 
philosophically possible. We are convinced that the 
impressive unity of the system of Dialectical Materialism 
should be matched and far surpassed. "12 While he speaks of 
realist phenomenology as a system of philosophy he goes on 
to add that above all the thematic approach is to be taken. 
The objects and questions of ethics, metaphysics, and 
epistemology, take precedence over the history of 
philosophy; and reality must not be forced to fit into a 
system, but rather, any system should follow the outline of 
reality. 
In this sense then, it is appropriate to speak of 
phenomenological realism as a system of philosophy. We have 
not only a method--the phenomenological way of.seeing--but 
also a circle of thinkers who have produced a body of 
writings using and justifying the method. While this may 
not have been the case during the period when Reinach first 
presented his paper Concer~ing Phenomenology, we 
nevertheless find many of the foundational truths which 
justify the method--truths which all who use the method 
should recognize with certainty--presented in this 
article. 
Let us begin by examining Reinach's discussion of the 
nature of synthetic apriori truths, those truths which 
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Fritz Wenisch of the University of Rhode Island has argued 
~ight more properly be called "necessary, informative 
truths". 13 As an example of such a truth, Reinach states 
that orange lies qualitatively between red and yellow. 
Using this example he states that: 
I need not be referred to some sense perception, 
which would have to lead me to a place in the world 
where a case of orange, red, and yellow could be 
found. Because of this, not only--as is often said--
does one need to perceive merely a single case in 
order to apprehend the a priori laws involved; in 
truth, one also does not need to perceive or 
' experience ' the single case. One need percieve 
nothing at all. Pure imagination suffices. Wherever 
in the world we find ourselves, the doorway to the 
world of essences and their laws always stands open 
to us.14 
This, however, may be an unfortunate example. While it 
is certainly true that one experience of the such being of 
a necessary essence is sufficient for apriori knowledge, as 
a general rule it is a contigent fact that humans need one 
experience of the object to be known. It is difficult to 
imagine a person who came to know the necessary nature of 
the colors red, yellow, or orange, without ever having 
percieved any colors. Perhaps a better example would be 
that of a person who came know the essential nature of love 
or justice through the exp~rience of hatred or 
injustice.15 
Reinach then goes on to distinguish this view from 
views which would threaten the objectivity of the truths 
discovered using this method. In response to psychologism 
he states that "Certainly necessity has a role to play in 
,,_ 
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the a priori, but the necessity is not one of thought . 
Rather, it is a necessity of being," and in conjunction 
with this idea he later adds that, "'states of affairs' 
obtain (bestehen) indifferently of what consciousness 
apprehends them, and of whether they are apprehended by any 
consciousness at all. In and for itself, the a priori has 
not even the least thing to do with thinking and 
knowing." 16 It should be noted that this later point, 
regarding the independence of states of affairs from minds, 
holds equally true of contigent states of affairs as well 
as necessary ones. 
Without a doubt, Reinach has touched upon a few 
fundamental truths which do, in fact, form a set of 
propositions which every realist phenomenologist--thinking 
in a phenomenological manner-- would necessarily assent to, 
namely, that we can make intuitive contact with essences, 
free from sensory experience, at any given time. Such 
intuitions into essences yield absolutely certain truths. 
These necessary truths result from a necessity of being and 
not from a necessity of our thoughts; their existence is 
fully independent of human minds which may or may not 
apprehend them. And to these truths he adds another, one 
which surprises many thinkers, when he says the following: 
up to now I have been dealing with the 
subjectification of the a priori. No less an evil 
is what I have previously called the 'impoverishment' 
of the a priori. There are few philosophers who 
have not in some way acknowledged the fact of the 
a priori; but there are none but what have in some 
way reduced it to a small province of its actual 
kingdom ... In truth, the realm of the a priori is 
1 3 
incalculably large."17 
This idea is essential to phenomenological realism. 
Necessary truths are not restricted to the realm of 
mathematics or logic, but are to be found in the areas of 
ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, theories of the person 
and any other realm in which we encounter necessary 
essences. 
In order to see this most clearly, we must turn to von 
Hildebrand , for Reinach is at times ambiguous concerning 
terminology. For example, Reinach states that "A priori 
laws also hold true of the material--in fact, of the 
sensible, of tones and colors."18 This is a misleading 
passage, for while I think he means only that there are 
necessary truths concerning essences which are exemplified 
in material or sensible particulars, he does not hold that 
all material objects possess necessary essences (although 
it may be said that matter, as such has a necessary 
essence). The former statement is wholly compatible with 
phenomenological realism while the latter is not. As matter 
of fact, von Hildebrand writes that "what is perhaps 
especially new in phenomenology is that this method is 
used, not only de facto, but epistemologically founded 
and legitimated by means of the all-important distinction 
between genuine essences and mere morphic unities."19 
This distinction between morphic unities and genuine, 
necessary essences is one of the most important ideas in 
realist phenomenology, and while it may be implicitly found 
14 
in the writings of Reinach, it is von Hildebrand who 
explicitly states it . It is a distinction which is perhaps 
worth mentioning at this point. 
Morphic unity can be found in objects such as tables, 
stones, and water. All of these objects possess a 
meaningful unity, they are not just chaotic masses, but 
rather, they are objects which can be spoken of 
universally. They constitute 'types' or 'kinds' of objects. 
However, all of these objects require many experiences of 
them in order to come to know what holds true of them as 
universals. It is primarily with these objects that science 
deals. It is possible to state truths about the nature of 
such unities, but such knowledge is always tentative and 
never known to be necessarily true. Thus, these objects 
cannot be known apriori. 
On the other hand, von Hildebrand cites three 
unmistable marks of the apriori: 1) strict intrinsic 
necessity; 2) incomparable intelligibility, and 3) the 
capacity to be known with absolute certainty. These three 
marks of the apriori are intimately related to and 
dependent upon the necessary essence of the object of any 
given apriori truth. In contrast to these necessary truths 
are merely factual truths. With regards to factual truths I 
merely state 'how it is', but concerning necessary truths I 
state 'how it must be.' And this 'how it must be' can only 
be seen when we are dealing with necessary essential unity. 
Such is the unity found in the nature of the square, love, 
15 
moral law, and logic. 
Again, it does seems that von Hildebrand must be 
credited with formally making this distiction between 
morphic unities and necessary essences . However, this 
distinction is found implicit in Reinach's writings, and, 
to the best of my knowledge, Reinach never actually 
violates this distinction. For example, in his statement 
that apriori truths hold of the material he refers the 
reader to the examples of tones and colors , both of which 
possess necessary essences and thus, their natures can be 
known apriori. In his discussion of objects which can be 
known apriori, he never presents us with a morphic unity , 
with the example of a table, a car, or a stone. Further, 
in his defense of the broad field of the apriori, he states 
that in all of his examples, "Existence is never 
posited."20 The fact that we can 'bracket' the actual 
existence of the objects about which he concerns himself 
tells us that he acquires his knowledge of the objects not 
through sensible contact with contingent objects, but 
through an intuitive contact with necessary essences. 
In such a fashion, Reinach and von Hildebrand 
delineate the method of phenomenology. And in combining 
Husserl's maxim "back to things themselves" with the idea 
of intuition into necessary essences, we touch upon the 
very core of realist phenomenology. While many realist 
phenomenologists are open to the Thomistic/Aristotelian 
notion of essences with regards to morphic unities, they 
16 
most sharply distinguish themselves from Aristotelians, 
nominalists, and reists, in their notion of necessary 
essences. If we are to find any notion of intuition into 
necessary essences throughout the history of philosophy, 
then we must look to the Platonic tradition. 
17 
CHAPTER TWO 
PHENOMENOMLOGICAL REALISM: AN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 
In many ways I view phenomenological realism as 
nothing more than a refined form of Platonism. In what 
follows, I will try to show a few examples of how Plato can 
be seen as the precursor to phenomenological realism. While 
it is quite clear that Plato never explicitly presents us 
with many ideas which are central to phenomenological 
realism, and that he probably was not consciously aware of 
many of the finer distinctions which we find in this 
philosophical movement, Plato did in fact raise many 
questions which cut to the heart of reality, and he 
postulated a theory of being which provides the basis of 
much phenomenological realist thought. Further, in the 
Platonic dialogues, we find many philosophical errors being 
uncovered, errors which must be avoided today as well. In 
these questions, theories of being, refutations of false 
doctrines, and above all, Plato's burning love for wisdom, 
we find the foundations of phenomenological realism. 
I would like to begin by looking at a passage of the 
Republic. From this one passage we can draw out at least 
four ideas which are central to phenomenological realism. 
As for those who contemplate many beautiful things 
but do not see Beauty itself and are incapable of 
following another who leads them to it, who see many 
1 8 
just actions but not Justice itself, and so with 
everything--these people, we shall say, opine 
everything but have no knowledge of anything they 
opine.--Of necessity. What of those who in each case 
contemplate the things themselves which are always in 
every way the same? Do these have knowledge, not 
opinion?--That too necessarily follows.21 
Let us begin with the very first line. In it we find 
the distinction between particulars--many beautiful things 
and many just actions--and forms--Beauty itself and Justice 
itself. These forms exist independently of the particulars, 
and unlike the particulars, these things themselves are 
always in every way the same. This is the first and perhaps 
most important notion for phenomenological realism: there 
exist timeless and unchanging forms which do not in any way 
depend upon our knowing them or the particulars which 
exemplify them. 
A second notion in connection with the forms is found 
in the responses which are given to Plato's questions about 
the nature of the knowledge which can be gained of these 
forms. The answer is: "of necessity," or later, "that too 
necessarily follows." The answer is not: "to date, that 
seems to be the case," or, "that is highly probable," but 
rather, "of necessity." This then, is another feature of 
the forms which Plato investigates (although it is not a 
feature of all objects which he speaks of universally)--the 
feature of necessity. 
The third idea found in this passage is one which we 
encountered in one of von Hildebrand's footnotes concerning 
the phenomenological method, namely, that some people are 
19 
unable to "see Beauty itself and are incapable of following 
~nother who leads them to it." The objectivity of the 
knowledge of forms is not jeopardised by the fact that not 
all persons are capable of intuition into essences--even 
with the aid of a philosopher. 
The fourth concept, one which is the foundation of the 
phenomenological attitude, is found in Plato ' s question as 
to the knowledge of "those who in each case contemplate 
the things themselves which are always in every way the 
same." Thus, when Husserl demands a return "Back to things 
themselves" we correctly understand it as a return to 
Plato's method of i nvestigation, a method in which we must 
"in each case contemplate the t hi ngs themselves. 11 Further, 
these things themselves--the objects of philosophy--are 
eternal, changeless forms, objects which yield knowledge 
and not mere opinion. 
Thus, from this one passage of the Republic we have 
uncovered four general principles which underlie 
phenomenology: 1) There are timeless and unchanging 
essences which can be known by human minds but do not 
depend upon human minds or the particulars which exemplify 
them; 2) with regards to the Forms which Plato actually 
investigates, we find knowledge which follows with 
necessity; 3) the objectivity of such knowledge is not 
jeopardised by the fact that not all people can "see" or 
make intuitive contact with essences; 4) philosophers must 
concern themselves with the things themselves--eternal, 
20 
changeless Forms. 
Nevertheless, it seems that phenomenological realism 
differs from Plato's philosophy in two very important ways. 
First, even if the phenomenologist refers to Platonic 
essences, he or she claims to know these essences through 
intuitive contact with them, not through recollection. 
Second, although we do not find the distinction explicitly 
made until von Hildebrand , the distinction between 
necessary essences, meaningful universals, and accidental 
unities is now the ontological foundation of 
phenomenological realism ' s theory of knowledge, and thus, 
we may ask if there is any anticipation of this distinction 
in the writings of Plato. 
In order to answer the first question, I would like to 
take a look at the Meno, for it is in this work that the 
doctrine of recollection is first introduced and it is here 
that we can gain some idea as to why Socrates proposes 
recollection as a method of knowledge. We find Socrates 
responding to Meno with the following: 
Do you realize what a debater's argument you are 
bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what 
he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot 
search for what he knows--since he knows it, there is 
no need to search--nor for what he does not know, for 
he does not know what to look for.22 
It is in response to this problem that Socrates 
introduces the notion of recollection, a doctrine which he 
tells us he learned from priests and priestesses and 
thought both true and beautiful. However, it is important 
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to focus upon the conclusion which he draws at the end of 
his presentation of the doctrine of recollection. 
I do not insist that my arguement is right in all 
other respects, but I would contend at all costs both 
in word and deed as far as I could that we will be 
better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that 
one must search for the things one does not know, 
rather than if we believe that it is not possible to 
find out what we do not know and that we must not 
look for it.23 
Now, when one understands the doctrine of recollection 
in this way--as a hypothesis which is proposed and believed 
(and claims are made only to the effect that he believes 
this theory not that he knows it) so that we may have some 
kind of justification for our search for and claims to have 
attained knowledge--then we find that Plato does not differ 
as greatly from the phenomenological realist as one might 
initially think. However, many phenomenological realists 
would differ from Plato in that they would hold that the 
epistemological/ontological theory of intuition into 
necessary essence is more than a plausible belief - it can 
be deductively proven using absolutely certain premises. 
Concerning the second question, as to whether or not 
Plato's writings implicitly contained the distinction 
between necessary essences, meaningful universals, and 
accidental unities, it seems that we can say that there is 
a period of Plato's thinking during which he did not seem 
to be aware of this distinction, however, at the time when 
he wrote the Parmenides it appears that he had some 
awareness of this distinction. This can be shown if we 
compare a portion of the Parmenides with the relevant 
sections of van Hildebrand's What is Philosophy. 
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We must first ask ourselves which objects fall under 
the distinct categories of necessary essences, meaningful 
universals and accidental unities. Of the accidental 
unities van Hildebrand tells us that there "are unities 
which are indeed possible, but which, with respect to the 
connection of their elements, are impoverished in 
meaning--purely accidental, like a heap of stones or a 
group of random tones which do not make up a melody."24 
Concerning meaningful universals von Hildebrand gives 
us the examples of "gold, metal, stone or water. These 
objects have a meaningful nature, a quiddity which 
justifies our speaking of them as real types. Their unity 
forms the basis for a true universality."25 However, this 
universality is known through abstraction; only through an 
inductive leap do we reach truths of a general nature 
concerning such objects. 
Finally, with regards to necessary essences van 
Hildebrand tells us that when "we deal with objects like a 
triangle, a person, will, love, and so forth, we are 
confronted with a totally new and different type of unity. 
These objects bring us to the stage of necessary unity."26 
In contrast to merely meaningful universals, von Hildebrand 
tells us that one of the distinguishing marks of necessary 
essences is the fact that "we are given the species 
concretely in the single thing."27 Thus, apriori knowledge, 
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properly understood, is made possible. 
Keeping in mind the examples of the three different 
levels of unity as distinguished by van Hildebrand, let us 
look at the following passage found in the Parmenides, 
paying special attention to the objects in question and 
Socrates' corresponding responses. 
This passage begins with Parmenides questioning 
Socrates as to whether or not he holds that there are 
forms, or characters, for certain objects--forms which 
exist independently of the particulars which exemplify 
them. Socrates replies affirmatively and Parmenides 
continues with his examination of Socrates in the following 
manner: 
And characters of this sort too? said Parmenides. For 
example, a certain character of just, alone by 
itself, and of beautiful and good, and all such as 
those in turn? 
Yes, he said. 
Well, is there a character of man separate from us 
and all such as we are, a certain character of man 
itself, or fire, or even water? 
I have often been in perplexity, Parmenides, he 
said, about whether one should speak about them as 
about the others or not. 
And what about these, Socrates--they would really 
seem ridiculous: hair and mud and dirt, for example, 
or anything else which is utterly worthless and 
trivial. Are you perplexed whether one should say 
that there is a separate character for each of them 
too, a character that again is other than the sorts 
of things we handle? 
Not at all, said Socrates. Surely those things 
actually are just what we see them to be, and it 
would be quite absurd to suppose that something is a 
character of them. Still, I sometimes worry lest what 
holds in one case may not hold in all; but when I 
take that stand, I retreat, for fear of tumbling 
undone into the depths of nonsense. So I go back to 
the things we just said have characters, and spend my 
time dealing with them.28 
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A brief comparison of this passage with von 
Hildebrand's examples of necessary essences, meaningful 
universals, and accidental unities will show that Plato had 
some rough notion of these distinctions. For example, when 
Parmenides enquires into the ontological status of Beauty, 
Justice and Goodness, Socrates responds with an unambiguous 
'yes', thus affirming that these do in fact comprise 
genuine essences or forms. Without a doubt these 
objects--Beauty, Justice and Goodness--would have a place 
along side of Love, and Will, and Triangle, in von 
Hildebrand's list of necessary essences. Further evidence 
of this is the fact that von Hildebrand has done 
phenomenological investigations of Love, Beauty, and 
Goodness, in his writings on ethics and aesthetics. 
Next, Parmenides questions Socrates as to whether 
there exist forms for man, fire, or water and Plato 
responds to the effect that he himself is not sure if we 
should speak in terms of forms with regards to these. Here, 
von Hildebrand would say we have descended to the level of 
merely meaningful universals and he himself gives the same 
example of water. The only exception to this is the unity 
of man. Considered corporally, it would be correct to speak 
of man as a merely meaningful universal. However, if we 
consider man as a person, as a spiritual being, then we 
encounter necessity, and thus, we would be justified in 
speaking of man as a necessary essence. It is 
understandable that Socrates was perplexed as to whether or 
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not we should speak of forms for such objects. They are 
universals, but they lack the feature of necessity. 
Finally, Parmenides enquires about the being of hair, 
mud, or dirt and Socrates replies that there exist . no 
forms, only the particular things as they are. While von 
Hildebrand would consider dirt as such, or hair as such, to 
be meaningful universals, he certainly would not consider a 
heap of dirt, or a mussed head of hair to possess any 
meaningful unity, but rather the grouping would possess a 
merely accidental unity. 
Thus, we find each of the three distinct levels of 
unity being presented by Parmenides, and further, we find 
Socrates responding in a manner which shows some kind of 
awareness of the distinct kinds of being which corresponds 
with the different kinds of objects. Further, in his 
searches for definitions, or his investigations of certain 
objects, he only concerns himself with those things which 
possess a necessary essence. To a large extent then, we 
find the same level of awareness of these distinctions in 
Plato ' s writings as we do in Reinach's writings. 
There is one other i~portant point which can be made 
concerning the way in which Socrates responds to 
Parmenides' question concerning the being of mud, hair and 
dirt. Socrates clearly denies the existence of forms for 
objects such as these, yet he goes on to add something both 
interesting and instructive. "Still, I sometimes worry lest 
what holds in one case may not hold in all: but when I take 
-
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that stand, I retreat, for fear of tumbling undone into 
depths of nonsense."29 Socrates did justice to the way 
things presented themselves to him, even though it differed 
greatly from both the Parmenidean and Heraclitian notions 
of reality. Rather than preserve a simple philosophical 
system, Socrates was true to Being itself. Josef Seifert 
explicitly states that this is a central aspect of the 
phenomenological attitude. 
The maxim 'back to things' also implies an opposition 
to premature systematizations which are among the 
most frequent mistakes made by philosophers. The 
ancient type ' Procrustes ' embodies an eternal 
inclination of the philosopher and of man in general . 
It is enormously tempting for the human mind to press 
reality into a Procrustes-bed, to cut off what does 
not fit into the bed and to strech 'small things ' so 
that they will fit our ready-made bed, as Procrustes 
is reported to have literally done to his guests.JO 
Although much more could be said of the ways in which 
Plato presents us with many of the foundational ideas and 
attitudes of phenomenological realism, I shall limit myself 
to just one more feature--a feature of both Plato and 
Socrates as persons. In Socrates, as portrayed by Plato, we 
find the most beautiful example of a philosopher; a true 
lover of wisdom. Truth is always thematic. He spent his 
life fighting the sophistical attitudes which perverted the 
tools of philosophy--rhetoric, dialectic , and most 
importantly, the mind. Further, the truth, once uncovered, 
was to be lived. This could not have been demonstrated in a 
clearer way; Socrates died for what he believed to be the 
truth. 
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This attitude which concerns itself with knowing, 
loving, and living according to the truth, is an attitude 
which is striven for in phenomenological realism today, and 
it is an attitude which is found in the writings of Plato 
as it is found nowhere else. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM: A CHREONTIC PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter, I would like to discuss the name 
' phenomenological realism ', or 'realist phenomenology ' as 
it is sometimes called , in order to determine whether or 
not it accurately describes this school of philosophy. It 
might be argued that this is not really an important issue , 
that , as a matter of fact, it is not even a philosophical 
issue , for a school of philosophy is a merely contingent 
object, an object which does not possess a necessary 
essence, and therefore, we cannot pursue insights into such 
an object. While I will grant that the question concerning 
this school ' s name is not, strictly speaking, a 
philosophical question, I will try to show that it is, 
nevertheless, a relatively important pragmatic question. 
However, apart from pragmatic motivations, it is hoped that 
this investigation into the name ' phenomenological realism' 
will reveal many different aspects of this philosophy and 
help put these different aspects into perspective. 
Historically speaking, there is no doubt that the 
circle of philosophers to which Reinach, Scheler, and von 
Hildebrand belonged rightly deserved the title 
' phenomenologists'. It was through the vital activity of 
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the Munich and Goettingen Circles , largely under the 
direction of Reinach ( in Goettingen), that the method of 
phenomenology became clarified and grew in popularity. 
These writers remained true to Husserl's earliest notions 
of phenomenology as presented in his Logical 
Investigations. 
However , Husserl himself, whether it be viewed as a 
turn from realism or a developement of his idea of 
philosophy as a rigorous science, did in fact come to 
embrace a view of phenomenology which was highly 
subjectivistic . While Reinach , Scheler , van Hildebrand , and 
many others did not follow Husserl ' s turn to transcendental 
idealism, a large number of philosophers did. 
Unfortunately, both groups of philosophers , the realists 
and the transcendental idealists , continued to identify 
themselves as phenomenologists, thus, Reinach, Scheler, and 
van Hildebrand have come to share the common title of 
phenomenologist with thinkers such as the later Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Sartre. 
To make matters worse, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, 
Heidegger, and Sartre have all risen to greater fame than 
any of those thinkers whom I have referred to as 
phenomenological realists. Thus the common philosopher 
understandably, although mistakenly, associates in his or 
her mind the name realist phenomenology with thinkers such 
as Sartre or Heidegger. 
I will give two example of such confusions. The first 
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comes from a discussion with one of my undergraduate 
psychology professors. Upon hearing of the International 
Academy of Philosophy in Liechenstein, he asked me what 
kind of philosophy they specialized in. When I responded 
that they focused upon phenomenological realism, he gave a 
condescending laugh and then went on to explain to me how 
the very name ' phenomenological realism ' was a 
contradiction of terms. He told me that 
phenomenology, rather than emphasizing the existence of 
objective truths and entities, focused upon the 
individual's subjective experience. Thus, in the eyes of 
this psychology professor, we are able to speak 
meaningfully of 'phenomenological existentialism', but the 
term ' phenomenological realism' is ridiculous. 
Clearly, this man was not familiar with the earliest 
roots of phenomenology. However, he was quite correct in 
his assessment of how phenomenology is commonly understood 
today, and his confusion as to the meaning of the term 
' phenomenological realism' was quite understandable. 
A second example, and a far more significant one, can 
be found in Andrew Woznicki's A Christian Humanism: Karol 
Wojtyla's Existential Personalism.31 Francis Lescoe, the 
current president of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association, says that it "is no exaggeration to say that 
Professor Woznicki is almost singly responsible for making 
Lublin Personalism known to the English speaking world."32 
Existential Personalism can be seen as an important and 
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quickly growing school of thought , especially within the 
Catholic Church, and further, it is a philosophy which 
Seifert and many other phenomenological realists are quite 
sympathetic to. Yet , in Woznicki ' s book we find a whole 
section devoted to " phenomenology and its limitations" ,33 
In this section , Woznicki tries to 'protect ' Wojtyla from 
the label of phenomenologist. He includes a quote from 
Wojtyla ' s first book, Evaluation of the Possibility of 
Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Principles of Max 
Scheler ' s System , in order to accomplish this task. 
A Christian thinker , and specifically a theologian, 
although availing himself in his writings of the 
phenomenological experience , cannot , however, be a 
phenomenologist. Consistent phenomenology will reveal 
to him, ethical values as appearing in the experience 
of a person ' on the occaision' of acting. However, it 
will always be the task of a theologian-ethician to 
scrutinize the ethical value of human actions 
themselves, i n the light of objective principles.34 
This quote reveals an unfortunate misunderstanding of 
the kind of phenomenology which Reinach, Scheler, and von 
Hildebrand are committed to. While even von Hildebrand has 
been known to criticize some of Scheler ' s ethical work, it 
would be wrong to see Scheler ' s phenomenology as being 
subjectivistic. Further, Wojtyla stated that consistent 
phenomenology will reveal "ethical values as appearing in 
the experience of a person 'on the occasion ' of acting. " 
This, however , is not incompatible with an investigation of 
ethical values as being objective , for we must not confuse 
the occasion on which we recognize a value with the 
necessary essence in which the ethical value is grounded. 
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The fact that ethical values are typically revealed upon 
the occasion of acting should not be viewed as 
problematic.35 The very thing which Wojtyla states must be 
done, "to scrutinize the ethical value of human actions 
themselves, in the light of objective principles," is 
precisely what is done in the ethical writings of 
phenomenological realism as exemplified by von Hildebrand. 
Further, these "objective principles'' themselves are 
understood as being grounded in the necessary essences of 
justice and moral goodness,--essences which are knowable to 
the human mind. Thus, necessarily, there is no trace of 
dependence upon human actions or human knowledge in order 
for ethical value as such to exist (although it might still 
be correct to say that the value of an individual moral 
action comes into existence only when the action is 
performed). 
In Woznicki's book, the label 'phenomenologist', has 
been treated like a dirty word and apologized for. The 
works of the later Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and 
Sartre, could easily be seen as writings done in a 
'phenomenological' vein, and if one understands the term 
phenomenology in this fashion, then it is understandable 
why a Christian would be wary of sharing the label 
phenomenlogist. However, it is not only these which 
Woznicki has identified as phenomenologists, but also 
Scheler. Perhaps the attack on Scheler's phenomenology is 
due to certain inaccuracies found in Scheler's writings, or 
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perhaps it is due to a misunderstanding of Scheler's 
methodology on the part of Woznicki. In any case, it is my 
contention that the phenomenology of Reinach, Scheler , and 
von Hildebrand is compatible with (and perhaps foundational 
to) any development of a Christian ethics and philosophy in 
general. 
"The term phenomenology has already assumed an 
ambiguous character today . " 3 6 If this statement was true in 
1960 when von Hildebrand first published What is 
Philosophy, then it is much more true today. Von 
Hildebrand himself gives the example of Quenten Lauer ' s 
confusion of Scheler's and his own phenomenology with 
Husserl ' s later transcendental idealism. Given these few 
examples of the confusions which have arisen from the use 
of the term ' phenomenology ' , even when referred to as 
'phenomenological realism ' , we may rightly ask ourselves if 
the term accurately describes the philosophical work of 
Reinach, Scheler, and especially von Hildebrand. 
The word itself, ' phenomenology ' , can b~ translated as 
a study of appearances. Thus, the very term ' phenomenology' 
is ambiguous. Some, such as the followers of transcendental 
idealism, would take this to mean that all we can come to 
know is the way a thing appears us as individuals, and 
never the way things really are. Others, however, would 
interpret the word 'phenomenology' as a study of what is 
immediately given. Clearly, this is much closer to what the 
phenomenological re al ist actually does. Nevertheless, we 
see that the term ' phenomenology' lends itself to 
misunderstanding. 
Seifert, in the introduction to his book Back to 
Things in Themselves, discusses this , e ry problem . 
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Perhaps, as Fritz Wenisch proposes, another new name 
should be given to such a philosophy, in order to 
avoid the subjectivist connotations which the term 
' phenomenology' might retain even in the expression, 
'realist phenomenology. ' He proposes chreontic 
philosophy -- from the Greek word, to chreon, the 
necessary -- which has only two further 
disadvantages: it sounds unfamiliar and tends to 
sever this philosophy from Husserl ' s Logical 
Investigations and others who spoke of 
phenomenology; besides , it picks only one object of 
philosophy, the essentially necessary, as 
representative for the whole object of philosophy 
which also includes contingent existence.37 
As my few examples have shown, the term 
'phenomenology' has indeed retained certain subjectivistic 
connotations, and when one considers that realist 
phenomenology is strongly opposed to all forms of 
subjectivism and relativism , it is especially unfortunate 
that it is often confused with such philosophies simply 
because of its name. Thus, it does seem reasonable to 
consider a name which might better express the most central 
aspects of this philosophy and at the same time free it 
from association with thinkers such Sartre, Heidegger, the 
later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. 
As Seifert mentions, Fritz Wenisch has suggested the 
term ' chreontic philosophy', which basically suggests a 
philosophy which is primarily concerned with intuitive 
analysis of necessary essences. However, Seifert, as the 
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above quotation indicates, has raised three criticisms of 
this term. The first two criticisms are that the term 
'chreontic philosophy' sounds unfamiliar and it 
disassociates the movement from Husserl's Logical 
Investigations and othe~ early phenomenologists who were 
key figures in the early development of realist 
phenomenology. In response, I have this to say: I would 
prefer a term which sounds unfamiliar, but accurately 
describes the philosophy, than one which sounds familiar, 
but constantly leads to confusion and the identification of 
a realism with various forms of idealism. It would, 
however, be unfortunate if this new name were to severe the 
philosophy from its early roots, but we must ask ourselves 
if this will necessarily happen. Is it not possible that a 
book concerning the history of chreontic philosophy could 
make reference to the foundational work of those who called 
themselves phenomenologists? Another consideration is this: 
as I see it, phenomenological realism must also look to 
Platonic realism as a part its early roots, and the name 
chreontic philosophy would perhaps more clearly denote this 
relationship. 
Seifert's third criticism of the term chreontic 
philosophy is that it makes reference only to the study of 
the necessary. Thus, while it accurately describes its 
concern with insight into necessary essences, it does not 
make reference to its concern with contingent objects, such 
as my own existence, or the existence of other persons. 
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Perhaps von Hildebrand can help us here. Von Hildebrand 
does state that: 
the phenomenological approach is not, however, 
restricted to the philosophical analysis of genuine 
essences, that is, to philosophical apriori 
knowledge. It is also indispensable for the deeper 
understanding of many data which play a predominant 
role in the humanities , such as a great individual 
personality, or the cultural epoch of baroque, or an 
individual work of art like King Lear, Mozart's 
Don Giovanni, etc.38 
Yet, elsewhere we find von Hildebrand telling us that 
the phenomenology which he, Reinach, and Pfaender embrace, 
differs greatly from Husserl's later notion of 
phenomenology. Referring to his, Reinach's and Pfaender's 
view of phenomenology he tells us that the 
"phenomenological approach in this sense is chiefly 
synonymous with the intuitive analysis of genuine, highly 
intelligible essences."39 Thus, if phenomenology is chiefly 
synonomous with the intuitive analysis of necessary 
essences, then the term chreontic philosophy is a very 
appropriate and accurate name for this philosophy. Further, 
the fact that the name emphasizes the central aspect of the 
philosophy, that is, the analysis of necessary essences, 
does not in any way imply that it denies or excludes the 
study of contigent existences. It merely suggests that the 
study of contingent existences is not the main focus of 
this philosophy. 
Before moving on, I would like to further examine the 
previous two quotes from von Hildebrand, for they reveal 
something which I consider to be important. In both quotes 
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he refers to the phenomenological approach: in the first he 
speaks of it as something which can be used to gain a 
deeper understanding of the data of the humanities, that 
is, a work of art, a great personality, or a cultural 
epoch; in the second example he speaks of it as a kind of 
philosophy which is chiefly synonomous with the intuitive 
analysis of necessary essences. What I would like to 
suggest is that in the first quote he is primarily making 
reference to phenomenology as an approach, and in the 
second quote is making reference to phenomenology as a 
brand of philosophy, one which differs from Husserl's. This 
distinction between phenomenology as an approach, and 
phenomenology as a school is seldom made explicit, and 
often confused. In this thesis I have been trying to 
uncover the roots and method of phenomenological realism -
a system of philsophy, yet, writers such as Reinach, 
Scheler, and von Hildebrand typically refer to it as a 
method, as an approach. In order to clarify the real method 
of phenomenological realism - a system of philosophy - I 
would like to distinguish between what I see as four 
distinct, although closely related, aspects of 
phenomenological realism. 
The first aspect of phenomenological realism is what I 
will call the phenomenological attitude. It is an attitude 
which desires to know a given object as it really is, to 
put aside all prejudices and preconceived notions, and 
allow the object to reveal itself to us. This 
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phenomenological attitude is often referred to as the 
phenomenological method, the phenomenological way of 
seeing, or the phenomenological approach. This however, 
leads to much confusion, for it is not a method, it is 
merely an attitude, and as the early phenomenologists were 
so fond of pointing out, it is an attitude which should be 
adopted when approaching all kinds of objects, both wi t ~in 
and outside of the field of philosophy. 
Actually, one of the best expositions of this attitude 
is found in von Hildebrand's analysis of the fundamental 
moral attitude, reverence , in the Art of Living. 
Describing the reverent man he says the following: 
He is free from this egospasm, from pride and 
concupiscence. He does not fill the world with his 
own ego, but leaves to being the space which it needs 
in order to unfold the value which it already 
possesses in its opposition to mere nothingness.40 
He goes on to add that: 
Confronted with being, the reverent man remains 
silent in order to give it an opportunity to speak. 
The man who possesses reverence knows that the world 
of being is greater than he is, that he is not the 
Lord who can do with things as He likes, and that he 
must learn from being, not the other way around.41 
This attitude, which von Hildebrand describes as 
reverence, is really the foundation to what the early 
phenomenologists saw as phenomenology. However, even if 
this attitude is foundational to phenomenological realism, 
it is only an attitude and should not be referred to as the 
phenomenological method. 
The second aspect of phenomenological realism, and 
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perhaps the least fixed, is what can be called a way of 
proceeding. In his book entitled Die Philosophie und Ihre 
Methode, Fritz Wenisch has distinguished between the 
method of philosophy and a way of proceeding.42 One may 
proceed in many different ways. I may begin doing 
philosophy by reading a philosophical work, or by fixing my 
mind upon an example which exemplifies the essence which I 
would like to analyze, or, by engaging in dialogue with a 
colleage. Thus, I may proceed in several different ways, 
and no one way of proceeding should be cited as the 
philosophical or phenomenological way of proceeding, 
(although it might be said that true phenomenology is 
opposed to any way of proceeding which begins by looking at 
a way of systematizing reality, rather than beginning by 
looking at reality itself). 
Distinct from the way in which one proceeds is the 
method which one uses in philosophy. Traditionally, 
philosophers would cite three methods: insight or 
intuition, deductive reasoning, and internal perception. 
Phenomenological realism, like most legitimate 
philosophical schools, uses all three methods. Further, the 
methods of repeated sensory observations and inductive 
generalization would be viewed as belonging to the realm of 
science and not philosophy. 
Closely related to the method of doing philosophy, is 
the ontological foundations and epistemological 
justifications of a philosophy. I would argue that the 
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ontological foundations of phenomenological realism lie in 
the notion of timeless, changeless, immaterial, necessary 
essences. Epistemologically speaking, we can say that when 
one is presented with such genuine essences, one is . able to 
know these essences with certainty through intuition or 
insight. That intuition is possible with regards to such 
objects is given simultaneously with any insight. That I, 
myself, can clearly see necessary features of essences is 
known to be true through internal perception and is given 
during the actual experience of having an insight through 
lateral consciousness. 
Applying what was just said, we can justify the use of 
deductive arguments. It is a feature of a deductive 
argument as such, that it possess a high degree of 
intelligibility and necessity. Thus, we can know that, when 
working with a valid argument form and true premises, we 
will necessarily arrive at a true conclusion (although the 
necessity of the truth of the conclusion may be only 
conditional and not absolute). In addition to this, we can 
say that the validity or invalidity of a deductive argument 
is intuitively obvious, and . grounded in the nature of the 
genuine essence of logical entities. 
Finally, while not grounded in or justified by the 
existence of a necessary essence, the method of internal 
perception can also yield absolutely certain truths. The 
best example of an absolutely certain truth known through 
internal perception is my knowledge of the fact that I 
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exist. The fact that I exist, is not known or proven by a 
syllogism -- 'I think, therefore, I am' but rather , I 
clearly recognize with certainty that I both think and 
exist through internal perception. The truth of these 
statements springs back into existence whenever I doubt 
them, as Augustine's ' Si fallor, sum ' so clearly 
expresses. 
Thus, we can see that phenomenological realism has 
four distinct, although closely related parts: an attitude, 
various ways of proceeding, a three-fold method, and an 
ontological foundation and epistemological justification of 
its method. At various times we find the early writers , 
Reinach , Scheler, and von Hildebrand, identifying 
phenomenology with one aspect or another, however, it would 
be more proper at this time to find a name (whether 
phenomenological realism or chreontic philosophy), which 
would describe the philosophy as a whole, and not just one 
aspect. 
I would argue that the term 'phenomenology' does 
justice to none of these aspects. Historically, Reinach , 
Scheler, and von Hildebrand used this term most often to 
describe the attitude which · I have largely identified with 
von Hildebrand's notion of reverence. It is only when the 
term phenomenology is used to refer to an attitude that we 
can allow Reinach to say that there are no truths which all 
who call themselves phenomenologist must ascribe to, for as 
a school of thought, there are certainly a few truths which 
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all who call themselves phenomenological realists must 
ascribe to. 
Seen as a system of philosophy, I think the term 
'chreontic philosophy' is more descriptive of what has been 
called phenomenological realism than the term 
'phenomenological realism.' 'Chreontic philosophy' refers 
to both the methods and corresponding epistemological 
justifications of insight and deductive reasoning. While 
internal perception is a third and legitimate method of 
doing philosophy, its use is not excluded by the term 
chreontic philosophy, it is merely not described as the 
central method, and this is true to the writings of 
Reinach, Scheler, and especially von Hildebrand. 
The only legitimate problem with the term is that it 
does not make immediate reference to the early 
phenomenologists who laid the foundation of this system. 
However, this limitation can be largely overcome through 
the writing of and awareness of the history of chreontic 
philosophy. Further, as mentioned earlier, I do not view 
the roots of this method as existing solely in the early 
writings of Husserl and his followers, but rather, to a 
large extent, they also lie in the writings of Plato. 
Most importantly, the term 'chreontic philosophy' 
avoids all confusions of this philosophy with the 
subjectivistic and idealistic philosophies of the later 
Husserl and those who followed and developed his 
transcendental idealism. In the promotion of 
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phenomenological realism, (perhaps especially within 
theistic circles), the use of the term chreontic philosophy 
may be much more advantageous. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHREONTIC PHILOSOPHY: THREE EXAMPLES OF ITS USE 
In this chapter, I would like to present the reader 
with three examples of how chreontic philosophy has been 
used to uncover reality. The first example is drawn from 
Adolf Reinach ' s analyses of the nature of promise and 
social acts as found in his A Priori Foundations of Civil 
Law; the second example comes from Max Scheler's sociology 
and phenomenology of Ressentiment; and the third from von 
Hildebrand's unfolding of the nature of the person in The 
Heart. All three examples have relied upon the intuitive 
analysis of necessary essences as their primary method. 
They all exemplify reverent and receptive attitudes towards 
the essences in question. The authors put aside 
preconcieved notions and prejudices in order to allow the 
objects to reveal themselves. Thus, these examples present 
the rea .r with some of the finest products of this system 
of philosophy. 
Due to the brevity of this thesis, I have attempted to 
briefly summarize small sections of these texts. I hope to 
present the reader with certain necessary features of the 
essences which are being analyzed. These are features which 
the individual author has discovered or brought to the 
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surface, they are features which were seen by the author. I 
s ·ay this because it would be a terrible mistake to view 
these works as inventions, or the products of one who has 
merely stipulated that when he uses the term "x" h~ means 
"the following." These are the products of persons who have 
fixed a given essence before their mind and proceeded to 
'describe' features which will hold true of it in every 
individual exemplification of it, whether or not the 
essence is, in reality, ever exemplified. 
Unfortunately, many of the finer points of these 
analyses, as well as the author's style of writing, are 
completely lost in summaries such as these. I strongly 
recommend to those who are interested in phenomenological 
realism that they read the following texts in their 
entirety. 
A. ADOLF REINACH'S ANALYSIS OF PROMISE - A SOCIAL ACT. 
Adolf Reinach (1883 - 1917) was unquestionably one of 
the earliest leaders of phenomenological realism. He 
completed his doctoral dissertation under the direction of 
Theodor Lipps, and his habilitation under the direction of 
Edmund Husserl. Von Hildebrand says of Reinach: 
In him I encountered the philosopher who made a 
profound impression on me by his unconditional love of 
truth, his intellectual power, his thoroughness, and 
his incomparable clarity. It was a great gift for me 
to discuss with him many philosophical questions. 
Later on in Goettingen, from 1910 on, he was my only 
teacher ... 4 3 
Husserl himself said that Reinach "was among the first who 
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could understand, creatively and perfectly, the peculiar 
meaning of the phenomenological method and could view it in 
its entire philosophical range."44 Elsewhere he states that 
it "was really Reinach who introduced me to my Logische 
Untersuchungen, and in an excellent way."45 
Let us now turn to Reinach's analysis of the nature of 
promise - a social act which produces both claim and 
obligation - as found in his Apriori Foundations of Civil 
Law. 
I would like to begin this summary with a quote from 
Reinach which presents us with the uniqueness of this 
investigation, a uniqueness and novelty which Reinach 
himself clearly saw. 
We can surely take it as generally granted that there 
are no self - evident and necessary relations of 
essence in the casual relations of external events. 
However it is, to speak with Hume, that we come to 
know that fire produces smoke, this is surely not 
intelligibly grounded in the essence of fire, as it 
lies in the essence of the number 3 to be larger than 
the number 2. There is no doubt that the causal 
relation is no necessary "relation of ideas.• But 
it would be a mistake to extend this principle to 
every relationship obtaining between temporally 
existing things. The case which is now before us is 
the best proof of this. A "cause" which can generate 
claim and obligation is the act of promising. From 
this act, as we shall show more exactly, proceed 
claim and obligation; we can bring this to evidence 
when we consider clearly what a promise is and when 
we achieve the intuition that it lies in the essence 
of such an act to generate claim and obligation under 
certain conditions. And so it is by no means 
experience in the sense of observation which 
instructs us, not even indirectly, about the 
existential connection of these legal entities; we 
have rather to do here with a self - evident and 
necessary relation of essence.46 
Thus, Reinach intends to do a chreontic investigation, 
47 
an investigation of the necessary and highly intelligible 
essence, of promise. A promise is a "causal" temporal 
event, that is, it exists in time and from this act proceed 
claim and obligation. Thus, it is similar to fire, which 
also exists in time and acts as a cause of smoke. Yet, it 
greatly differs from fire, for the causal relation of fire 
to smoke is not known as self-evident, this knowledge is 
not due to a necessary relation between fire and smoke; but 
the relation between promise on the one hand, and claim and 
obligation on the other, is known as self-evident, due to 
the necessary relationship which exists between the 
essential natures of these objects . Thus, the nature of 
promise is not only interesting, but it rightly belongs to 
the sphere of philosophy. 
Reinach begins by posing the question "What is a 
promise really?" 
The usual answer is that promising is a declaration 
of will, or more exactly, an expressing or making 
known the intention of doing or omitting something in 
the interest of another to whom the utterance is 
made. Why this utterance should oblige and entitle is 
of course far from being understandable. It is after 
all certain that the mere intention to do something 
does not have any such effect.47 
As he states, the typical definitions of promise leave 
one wondering why claim and obligation should follow as a 
result of making a promise. In order to uncover the true 
nature of promise, Reinach investigates the essential 
nature of the general class of acts to which promising 
belongs, namely, social acts. 
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There exist certains actions which reveal the self as 
acting. These he calls spontaneous acts and he give the 
examples of turning our attention to an object or making a 
resolution. 
It would be quite a mistake to want to find the 
distinguishing mark of these experiences in their 
intentionality. The regret which rises up in me, or 
the hatred which asserts itself in me, are also 
intentional in that both refer to some object. 
Spontaneous acts have in addition to their 
intentionality also their spontaniety, whi ch lies in 
this, that in them the self shows itself to be the 
phenomenal originator of the act.48 
Now, in this category of spontaneous acts we find two 
major sub-categories. The first is represented by the act 
of deciding. It is an internal act. It can be performed 
without being announced or needing to be announced to 
another. 
The second category of spontaneous acts consists of 
other-directed experiences such as forgiving, or envying. I 
cannot envy or forgive myself, these acts must always be 
directed towards another. 
When we consider the act of commanding we encounter 
yet another division, for the act of commanding requires 
not only that it be directed toward another, but also that 
it be heard. This is not the case with forgiving or 
envying, for I can envy or forgive someone without 
announcing it to another, it can, so to speak, unfold 
entirely within, even though it is directed towards 
another. However, in the case of commanding, the act 
requires that it be heard by another in order for it to 
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fully come into existence. 
Reinach states that we "designate the spontaneous acts 
which are in need of being heard, social acts," and it is 
to this category that the act of promising belongs.49 Thus, 
if we can unfold the nature of social acts in general, we 
will uncover a multitude of features which necessarily 
belong to the nature of a promise. 
At the present, we can already say that a promise is a 
spontaneous act (that is, it is one in which the self shows 
itself to be the phenomenal originator of the act), it is 
intentional, it has the feature of being other-directed, 
and it is in need of being heard. Much more, however, can 
be said. 
In order to uncover the nature of social acts in 
general, Reinach investigates the essential natures of the 
following acts: informing, requesting, commanding, and 
questioning. Each of these objects in turn has a 
correspo~ding "internally complete experience whose 
intentional object coincides with the intentional object of 
the social act or is at least somehow related to it."50 
Reinach speaks of social acts as having a body and a 
soul, an inner and an outer . side. It is interesting to note 
that the outer side, the external expression - a gesture, 
words, or a facial expression - is a required feature among 
men, however, it is not a necessary feature. The feature of 
being heard, on the other hand, is necessary. As the 
example of prayer to God will show, it is possible that the 
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act be heard by another with absolutely no external act. 
Thus, while interacting with humans, we will always find an 
outer expression, a body, so to speak, which corresponds 
with the social act, but this is not an essential feature. 
For the sake of brevity, I will present some of the 
features of social acts only in the context of how these 
features relate to the nature of a promise. The following 
quote will reveal the depth of Reinach's investigation of 
the nature of a promise. In order to highlight the features 
which are common to all social acts (not just promising), 
as well as the modifications common to all social acts, I 
have added two sets of underlined numbers which are not 
found in the text. 
Let us return to our starting point, the act of 
promising. It does not take a long explanation to 
.show why we find promising to be an other-directed 
social act. (1) It inaugurates a train of events, 
like commanding and unlike informing. It too aims at 
an action, though of course not at one of the 
recipient of the act, but at one of the promisor 
himself. This action need not be a social ·act as in 
the case of questioning. 
Like all social acts, (g) promising presupposes 
an inner experience which has the content of the 
promise as its intentional object. As with 
commanding, this inner experience is that of 
intending that something occur, not of course through 
the addressee but through the promisor himself. Every 
promising to do this or that, presupposes that one's 
will is directed to this action. 
As a social act, promising admits of all the 
modifications which we discussed above. These are 
(1) promises which are directed to several persons 
together, or (g) performed by several together. 
From these acts proceed claims which several persons 
share together, and obligations which bind several 
together. Further, there is (~) a conditional 
promising, which we will have to distinguish sharply 
from(~) unconditional promising with conditional 
content. From the former, claim and obligation come 
into being only on the fulfillment of the condition, 
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for only then does the promise unfold its 
proper efficacy . From the latter, claim and 
obligation come into being immediately . .. In addition 
to one ' s own promising, there is (§) promising in 
the name of another, a representative promising . A 
person performs an act of promising, but he is not 
the one who promises; he rather lets another promise, 
or more exactly, he promises for another.51 
Reinach thus concludes that: 
We now see clearly how thoroughly mistaken and 
untenable is the usual conception of promising as an 
expressing of intention or of will. An expression of 
will runs like this: I intend. If it is directed to 
someone, then it is an informing, which is indeed a 
social act but no act of promising. And of course, it 
does not become a promise by being directed to the 
one who will profit from the intended action. 
Promising is neither intending nor the expression of 
intending; it is rather an independent spontaneous 
act which in turning without, expresses itself ... and 
we claim that it lies in the essence of this act to 
bring forth claims and obligations.52 
In such a fashion, Reinach has described the essential 
nature of promising, and in the process he has uncovered a 
whole new sphere: the realm of social acts. 
MAX SCHELER: ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGV·OF 
RES SENTIMENT 
Herbert Spiegelberg begins his discussion of Max 
Scheler, (1874 - 1928), with the following: 
There can be little question that in the early 
twenties before the advent of Martin Heidegger Max 
Scheler was in the eyes of the German public the 
number two phenomenologist; in fact to many he was 
more - a star of the first magnitude whose dazzling 
light revealed more than the prominent member of a 
new school: a philosopher of the age.SJ 
Max Scheler undoubtedly played a major role in the 
formation of phenomenological realism, however, it was a 
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role quite different from that of Husserl's or Reinach's. 
Edith Stein, who was a member of the Goettingen circle, has 
provided us with one of our best sources of information 
pertaining to Scheler's activities during the formative 
yPars of phenomenology. She writes that "one's first 
impression of Scheler was fascination. In no other person 
have I ever encountered the 'phenomenon of genius' as 
clearly. The light of a more exulted world shone from his 
large blue eyes."54 However much Stein admired Scheler, she 
was, nevertheless, not blind to certain features which 
greatly distinguished Scheler from Husserl and Reinach. 
After being dismissed from the University of Munich as 
a result of a scandalous divorce suit, Scheler depended 
upon his writings and his lectures in order to support 
himself. Largely due to the support of Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, Scheler was frequently invited to give lectures 
to the Philosophical Society at Goettingen.55 His 
relationship with Husserl was often marked by tension due 
to several factors. Nevertheless, Scheler seems to have had 
a tremendous impact upon many of the students who studied 
under Husserl during the early days of phenomenology. Stein 
sums up the situation as follows: 
Added to this competition for priority was Husserl's 
serious concern regarding his students. He took great 
pains to educate us to rigorous objectivity and 
thoroughness, to a 'radical intellectual honesty.' In 
contrast, Scheler's practice of scattering about 
ingenious suggestions without pursuing them 
systematically had something dazzling and seductive 
about it. Moreover, he chose topics of vital personal 
importance to his young listeners, who, consequently, 
were easily affected by them. Husserl on the other 
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hand addressed sober, abstract matters. However at 
that time in Goettingen, despite such tensions 'their 
' association was still mutually friendly.56 
Apart from Husserl, Scheler is perhaps more than any 
other philosopher to come out of this early 
phenomenological circle, both the most prolific and the 
most well-known. In what follows I have tried to summarize 
the first section of his work entitled Ressentiment, a 
term which he borrowed from the French because he could 
find no suitable German equivalent.57 This work has been 
highly praised and some consider it his clearest example of 
phenomenology done properly. 
Scheler begins this investigation into the nature of 
resentiment (I will use the English equivalent of the 
French term), with a consideration of the meaning of the 
word. 
In the natural meaning of the French word I detect 
two elements. First of all, ressentiment is the 
repeated experiencing and reliving of a particular 
emotional response reaction against someone else. The 
continual reliving of the emotion sinks it more 
deeply into the center of the personality, but 
concomitantly removes it from the person's zone of 
action and expression ... Secondly, the word implies 
that the quality of this emotion is negative, i.e., 
that it contains a movement of hostility.Sa 
Scheler presents us with a lengthy quote which 
demonstrates Nietzsche's use of the term, however, Scheler 
asks the reader to allow him to proceed with an 
investigation of resentiment as such, apart from the 
context in which Nietzsche introduces the term. 
Instead of defining the word, let us briefly 
characterize or describe the phenomenon. 
Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which 
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has quite definite causes and consequences. It is a 
lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic 
repression of certain emotions and affects which, as 
such, are normal components of human nature. Their 
repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge 
in certain value delusions and corresponding value 
judgements. The emotions and affects primarily 
concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the 
impulse to detract, and spite.59 
This one paragraph neatly summarizes two essential 
features of resentiment. The first feature which he 
presents us with is that resentiment is caused by the 
systematic repression of emotions which are quite normal 
for humans to experience. Thus, it is when feelings of 
vengefulness, envy, or jealousy, are systematically 
repressed, that resentiment is given the environment to 
flourish. The second feature is that resentiment leads to 
value delusions. The recognition of this feature is 
all-important, for it then allows Scheler to criticize 
Nietzche's claim that Christian values are based upon 
ressentiment. 
His exploration of the normal emotions, which, when 
repressed lead to resentiment, is interesting. He cites the 
thirst for revenge as the most important source of 
resentiment. Revenge as such has certain features: it is a 
reaction; it is always preceeded by an attack; it generally 
is directed towards a specific object, and contains the 
notion of returning evil for evil. 
The fact that revenge has a specific object is 
important. It is characteristic of the move from revenge to 
resentiment that the person loses focus upon a specific 
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object. Here we encounter vindictiveness. We find several 
features which are common to vindictiveness as well: the 
object towards which one's feelings are directed becomes 
more indeterminate; the desire begins to feel 'righteous' 
and is accompanied by a feeling of duty. Scheler adds that 
a person will not reach this level of vindictiveness if 
either one of two things occurs: the person forgives the 
wrong which was done to him, or, the person actually 
avenges himself. Further: 
Ressentiment can only arise if these emotions are 
particularly powerful and yet must be suppressed 
because they are coupled with the feeling that one is 
unable to act them out - either because of weakness, 
physical or mental, or because of fear ... If an 
ill-treated servant can vent his spleen in the 
r 1techamber, he will remain free from the inner venom 
of ressentiment, but it will engulf him if he must 
hide his feelings and keep his negative and hostile 
emotions to himself.SO 
In a similar vein, he later adds that: 
revenge tends to be transformed into ressentiment 
the more it is directed against lasting situations 
which are felt to be 'injurious' but beyond one's 
control - in other words, the more the injury is 
experienced as destiny.61 
The second major source of resentiment is envy. 
'Envy', as the term is understood in everyday usage, 
is due to a feeling of impotence which we experience 
when another person owns a good we covet. But this 
tension between desire and nonfulfillment does not 
lead to envy until it flares up into hatred against 
the owner, until the latter is falsely considered to 
be the cause of our privation.62 
Pointing to the only way one can avoid envy, he quotes 
Goethe: "against another's great merits, there is no remedy 
but love."63 
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In connection with envy, he cites two different types 
of persons: the noble man, and the common man. The most 
distiguishing feature between the two is this: the "noble 
man experiences value prior to any comparison, the common 
man in and through a comparison. "64 Thus, we either 
find the common man trying to acquire more, for the sake of 
being most highly esteemed, or failing to achieve this 
esteem, the man becomes full of resentiment and becomes 
subject to value delusions. 
the common man seeks a feeling of superiority or 
equality, and he attains hjs purpose by an illusory 
devaluation of the other man's qualities or by a 
specific 'blindness ' to these qualities. But secondly 
- and here lies the main achievement of 
ressentiment - he falsifies the values themselves 
which could bestow excellence on any possible objects 
of comparison.GS 
We find this same idea elsewhere in his analysis: 
we must introduce an additional psychological law. We 
have a tendency to overcome any strong tension 
between desire and impotence by depreciating or 
denying the positive value of the desired object.66 
Thus~ because this is a "psychological law", he is 
able to add that this: 
'falsification of the value tablets,' 
'reinterpretation,' or 'transvaluation' should not be 
mistaken for conscious lying. Indeed, it goes beyond 
the sphere of judging . . It is not that the positive 
value is felt as such and that it is merely declared 
to be 'bad.' Beyond all conscious lying and 
falsifying, there is a deeper 'organic mendacy. '67 
However common this tendency to falsify values is in 
man, it is nevertheless true that values can be recognized 
as they truly are. 
Nietzsche is wrong in thinking that genuine morality 
springs from ressentiment. It rests on an eternal 
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hierarchy of values, and its rules of preference 
are fully as objective and clearly 'evident' as 
mathematical truths. There does exist an ordre du 
coeur and a logique de coeur (in Pascal's words) 
which the moral genius gradually uncovers in history, 
as it is eternal - only its apprehension is 
'historical.' 68 
A further point which Scheler makes with regards to 
Nietzche's ethical skepticism is that Nietzsche continually 
speaks of a "falsification of the value tablets," yet the 
very term 'falsification' implies that there exists a true 
set of values. 
In my summary I have focused only upon the first 
chapter of Scheler's book entitled Ressentiment. In the 
text he goes far beyond the few features which I have 
focused upon, however, it is hoped that this summary has 
nevertheless presented the reader with a small intimation 
of the genius which is found in this book. This book points 
to the validity of an "apriori psychology", which of 
course, has been wholly abandoned by the field of 
psychology today. This book, however, demonstrates that the 
intuitive analysis of human emotions and behavior can be 
quite fruitful. 
VON HILDEBRAND: ON THE HEART - A THIRD CENTER OF THE PERSON 
Dietrich van Hildebrand, (1889 - 1977), began as a 
student of Theodor Lipps, but soon moved from Munich to 
Goettingen in order to study under Husserl, Scheler, and 
Reinach. Both his Ethics and his What is Philosophy are 
philosophical masterpieces and have become 'classics' in 
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the contemporary circle of phenomenological realism. While 
largely unknown to the world of philosophy, he is seen by 
many (including the present author) as the person who has 
most clearly presented us with the epistemology, ontology, 
and axiology which are foundational to chreontic 
philosophy. Joseph Seifert and John Crosby, in their 
obituary of von Hildebrand, state that, the "whole of von 
Hildebrand's works would fill at least twenty volumes, and 
this does not include his rich Nachlass ... which contains 
many manuscripts on problems of logic, language, causality, 
freedom, justice, philosophy of religion, and on other 
subjects." ~9 
While von Hildebrand's notion of the heart can be 
found scattered throughout many of his various works, I 
will be working primarily with his book entitled The 
Heart, (although I will make some reference to his chapter 
on value response from his Ethics). Originally published 
as The Sacred Heart, it is a defense of the relatively 
new Roman Catholic devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus 
and an analysis of the affective sphere in general. While 
many parts of this book would be considered religious 
writing, Part One - the Human Heart, while making full use 
of religious examples, is actually a phenomenology of the 
heart, a third center of the person. When one considers 
that throughout the history of philosophy, only the 
intellect and the will have been identified as central 
faculties of the person, we begin to see how important von 
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Hildebrand's formal presentation of the heart is. 
In some respects The Heart is not the best example 
of von Hildebrand's philosophical writing. While most of 
his works are quite orderly and precise in meaning, this 
book is at times haphazard and slightly ambiguous. However, 
while the book's external order is at times rough, one 
finds that it has an inner order which mirrors reality and 
his insights into the nature of the heart are profound. 
He begins his analysis by examining the role of heart 
and points to three main perversions of affective 
responses. The first, and an extremely common one, is to 
shift the focus from the object to the affective response. 
One of my undergraduate professors, James Harold, tells a 
story of how he first became aware of this perversion. When 
he first listened to Mozart he was deeply moved. He had an 
experience of what von Hildebrand calls "being affected" 
and responded with the emotions which should properly 
result from such an experience. His feelings were shaped by 
the beauty and magnificience of the music. However, when he 
again sat down to listen to Mozart he paid less attention 
to the music and focused instead on his anticipated 
emotional response. He soon realized that not only was this 
a perversion of the response, but it simply didn't work 
that is, he did not experience the feelings which he 
earlier had when focusing on the majestic music. 
A second perversion occurs when we detach the response 
from the object and see it as having its meaning in itself. 
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I think an example of this might occur when two new lovers 
consider the feeling of being in love as something which is 
valuable in and of itself, apart from the value of the 
beloved or the relationship with the beloved. These 
feelings may play an important role in the development of 
the relationship, but they must never be seen as valuable 
in themselves, detached from the beloved who motivated the 
feelings. 
The third perversion of affective responses occurs 
when we reduce an affective response to something which is 
outside of the affective sphere. Von Hildebrand states that 
"This occurs for example when one makes of the liability 
resulting from a promise which is an objective juridical 
entity, a mere 'feeling' of liability."70 
While von Hildebrand does briefly examine some of the 
faulty theories concerning the affective sphere, he does 
not lay the full blame on these for the way this sphere has 
been discredited. Also to blame is the unparallelled danger 
of "ungenuineness• which is to be found within the 
affective sphere. In an uncharacteristically Hegelian way, 
he again gives three examples. 
The first kind of affective ungenuineness is 
rhetorical. "This is typified by the man who exhibits a 
false pathos and enjoys his indignation or his enthusiasm 
by inflating it rhetorically.•11 
The second kind of ungenuineness is the sentimental 
type. Such a person is "self- immersed•. He or she enjoys a 
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feeling for its own sake and loses focus on the motivating 
object. 
Lastly, he speaks of the hysterical type. He calls 
this "classical falseness". The person is "imprisoned in an 
excitable egocentricity", "everything they do or say, is 
poisoned by an inveracity and falsity ... artificially 
heightened and embellished."72 
The Heart is so rich in examples and insights that 
certainly I am not able to do it justice in a few pages, 
and perhaps I do von Hildebrand a disservice if one reads 
this summary and walks away considering himself familiar 
with Hildebrand's notion of the heart. Due to the brevity 
of this paper I shall consider only two more of von 
Hildebrand's ideas, however, I would like to emphasize that 
what I have given is certainly not a concise summary of his 
thought but perhaps only a poor intimation of it. Any 
analysis of The Heart which fails to mention the idea of 
"being affected", or his analysis of the many false 
equivocations of the word 'passions', or again, his 
distinction between bodily and psychic feelings versus 
intentional affective responses, grossly fails its task. 
Central to von Hildebrand's ethics and his notion of 
the heart is the idea of value response. This perhaps 
parallels C.S. Lewis' doctrine of objective value which 
states that certain objects demand a specific emotional 
response from us. However, von Hildebrand goes much further 
in distinguishing the different aspects of this 
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phenomenon. 
For van Hildebrand, values demand an affirming 
response such as love, gratitude or joy, (and in some 
instances volitional responses as well). These responses in 
a manner of _speaking say "yes" to their object. A young 
child is a good example of an object which demands such a 
response. This is why C.S. Lewis, in the Abolition of 
Man, rightly sees that his lack of affection for children 
is a defect in himself. 
A disvalue is such that it demands a rejecting 
affective response such as hatred or disgust, responses 
that answer "no" to the object. Clearly if we witnessed a 
man beating on an innocent young child we should react with 
disgust and even anger towards this action (and if we were 
in a position to help the child we should also make the 
volitional response to try to do so). This event possesses 
such a clear disvalue that one would either have to be 
completely value blind or evil not to render the proper 
response.73 
Let me now clarify something. What von Hildebrand 
means by a value response is only an adequate response to 
something which possesses either a value or a disvalue. The 
term 'value response' seems misleading because according to 
its natural connotation it can be interpreted in two ways, 
and further, the term is insufficient for does justice to 
neither interpretation. The first way one could interpret 
the term 'value response' would be to assume that it refers 
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to the object and that this object possesses a value. 
However, this tells us nothing about whether it was an 
adequate response, and further, it does not include 
responses to disvalues. A second understanding of the word 
would be to take it to mean that the response itself 
possesses a value. In this case, we find that it still does 
not accurately delineate the sphere of values, for it does 
not include the idea of those responses which possess a 
great disvalue, such as enjoying the sight of a young child 
being beaten. 
For this reason I propose two new terms which would 
more clearly circumscribe the class of responses which von 
Hildebrand spoke of in as 'value responses': 'value 
carrying responses' and 'disvalue carrying responses.' When 
we find that we are dealing with morally relevant objects 
the following generalization will hold true: the former 
could only be good, that is, it is either the rejecting of 
a disvalue or the affirming of a value, and the later could 
only be bad, that is, it is either the rejecting of a value 
or the affirming of a disvalue. 
It is important to note that while these new names do 
not contain a direct reference to the objects which 
motivate the responses, they do accurately tell us about 
the objects, for a response can only carry value if it is 
an appropriate response to an object which possesses value 
or disvalue, and similarly, a response can only possess 
disvalue if it is an inappropriate response to an object 
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which possesses either value or disvalue. Thus these term 
-are at least unambigous. However, one might object that 
they put the focus upon the responses and not the objects 
which motivate the responses. In such a case the only good 
alternative is to create four new terms, each of which 
should include reference to whether or not the response was 
adequate or inadequate and whether it was directed towards 
a value or a disvalue. Thus, we might speak of 1) value 
carrying responses to a value, 2) value carrying responses 
to a disvalue, 3) disvalue carrying responses to a value, 
and finally, 4) disvalue carrying responses to a disvalue. 
In any case, use of the term 'value response' should be 
avoided because it is clearly an ambiguous term. 
Lastly, I would like to just mention the way in which 
von Hildebrand in his Ethics relates freedom to our 
affective responses. While C.S. Lewis points out that no 
emotion is a judgement, and thus, all emotions should be 
considered alogical, one might also add that no emotion is 
totally within our freedom and thus all emotions should be 
said to be amoral as well. However, just as Lewis points 
out that emotions are still related to reason in that they 
can conform or fail to conform to it, so emotions are 
related to the will.74 Through what von Hildebrand calls 
cooperative freedom one can take a free stance towards his 
or her emotions. A man can either say •yes" to his lustful 
feelings, or he can disavow them. In disavowing an emotion 
I say "no" to it through an exercise of my mind and my will 
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and in doing so I create what can be called a "distance 
between the response and my free spiritual center."75 
Not only through cooperative freedom but also through 
indirect freedom is the will related to the heart. With 
indirect freedom we find that we can slowly change our 
character such that inappropriate responses are less 
frequent and appropriate ones more frequent. Through 
indirect freedom emotions are perhaps made a little more 
logical and moral. But clearly this task calls for the 
assistance of a good and true psychology. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REPLIES TO THREE OBJECTIONS 
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Thus far we have looked at phenomenological realism as 
a twentieth century philosophy, a form of Platonism, and a 
chreontic philosophy. We have seen in what ways it is a 
classical philosophy and in what ways it is a new and 
revolutionary philosophy. We have looked at several 
examples of how this method of doing philosophy and the 
'phenomenological attitude' have been applied in order to 
uncover the nature of promise, of ressentiment, and of the 
human person. What we have not done is to look at some of 
the common criticisms of phenomenological realism and all 
other schools of thought which hold the existence of 
necessary essences and the potential of man to gain 
knowledge of these essences through intuition or insight. 
That is what this final chapter is intended to do, and I 
think it has its place in this study of the roots and 
method of phenomenological realism, for this thesis is not 
intended to be a purely historical study. It is largely an 
investigation into the nature of philosophy itself and I 
have presented phenomenolog~cal realism as a school of 
thought which has greatly contributed to a positive 
formulation of what the objects of philosophy are and how 
we can come to know them. Thus, it is only natural that I 
should address certain objections which have been raised 
against the notions of insight and Platonic essences. 
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A. ON THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTATION 
I would like to reflect upon one of Bruce Aune's most 
recent papers and critically examine some of the more 
important ideas contained therein. 
I would summarize his paper as follows: it is a brief 
presentation and examination of some of the most basic 
epistemological methods of philosophy. He states in the 
first paragraph that he is "concerned with only one aspect 
of the philosophical method, not the whole thing", and this 
one aspect is philosophical argumentation. However, in the 
course of investigating philosophical argumentation, he 
seems to bring into question the entire epistemological 
foundations of philosophy. If the arguments in his paper 
are sound, then they are certainly destructive to the 
foundations of phenomenological realism, for in this paper 
he argues against insight as a method of knowing, and 
excludes its use in philosophical argumentation. Thus, a 
response is in order. 
His reflections begin by questioning the rigor of 
traditional philosophical thought and he introduces, by way 
of example, the long standing debate between himself 
(defending the soft determinism of G.E. Moore), and the 
agency theorists, Chisholm and Lehrer. I would like to 
briefly summarize this dispute and then show how Aune has 
used it to try to demonstrate the shortcomings of 
traditional argumentation. 
In short, G.E. Moore tried to interpret freewill in 
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such a way that it would be compatible with a metaphysical 
determinism. Accepting the popular definition of freewill 
as 'S acts freely only if Scan do otherwise', he went on 
to hypothetically interpret the sense of 'can' used in the 
definition. The result was this: Scan do A= df. Swill do 
A if S chooses to do so. 
Both Chisholm and Lehrer responded with examples which 
demonstrated that Moore's analysans, that is, 'Swill d0 A 
if S chooses to do so', is consistent with the supposition 
that S cannot choose to do A. Therefore, S could not do A 
because, according to Moore's analysis, choosing A is a 
prerequisite for doing A. Chisholm and Lehrer concluded 
that Moore's analysandum, 'Scan do A', is not consistent 
with such a supposition and therefore is not equivalent 
with its analysans. Thus, Moore's analysis is incorrect. 
Over twenty years ago, Aune criticized the responses 
given by Chisholm and Lehrer by claiming that they merely 
begged the question in assuming that Moore's analysans was 
consistent with the following two ideas: 'S could have done 
A only if Shad willed to do A' and 'It is not the case 
that Shad willed to do A' .76 While Aune still holds that 
Chisholm and Lehrer merely begged the question, he no 
longer considers the idea of question begging to be a 
sufficiently clear notion to provide a decisive criticism. 
While I disagree with Aune's original criticism, I shall 
prescind from it, for I am far more interested in his 
present criticism; and it is this criticism which brings 
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into question the methods of traditional philosophical 
argumentation. 
His present criticism is this: "the decisive and 
instructive shortcomings of Chisholm's and Lehrer's 
arguments lie in their claims to be refutations, (that is, 
disproofs) of something."77 In considering the nature of a 
strict philosophical proof Aune states that "if, unlike 
Descartes and Spinoza, we think there are no material 
philosophical axioms, we might want to say that proofs 
cannot be given in philosophy."78 
It seems that he is referring here to the age old 
insight into the nature of a philosophical proof which 
Aristotle discusses in both his Topics79 and his 
Posterior Analyticsao. It is simply this: if we are to 
accept only those premises which are deductively proven, 
then we shall end in an infinite regress of proofs while 
looking for an absolutely certain first premise. 
Aune does however, charitably add that he is "prepared 
to speak of a proof in a loose sense--one in which 'axiom' 
is replaced by 'elementary, non-controversial truth' .•a1 
But certainly, this "loose proof• is no proof at all, and 
in laying down his main criticism of the methods of 
traditional philosophical argumentation, he has set himself 
up for my main criticism of his paper. However, before 
proceeding with this criticism, I would like to briefly 
summarize the remainder of his paper. 
After concluding that Chisholm and Lehrer have failed 
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to offer a refutation or disproof of G.E. Moore's 
hypothetical interpretation of freewill, he goes on to 
point to the meager value which deductively valid nonproofs 
have. "One is to relate philosophically interesting 
conclusions to novel information obtained, often, outside 
of philosophy--in mathematics, physics, computer science, 
neurology, or economics• and the other is "dialectical: 
they are used in showing a philosopher what is implied by 
assumptions that he or she is considering."82 
The rest of his paper amounts to a belittling of the 
worth of the deductive argumePts found throughout the 
history of philosophy and the proposal of the scientific 
hypothetico-deductive model as the method best suited for 
doing philosophy. The following is a brief summary of this 
method: "some phenomenon or datum is identified as the 
subject of inquiry, and a hypothesis is constructed to 
account for it. The hypothesis is then tested _by deducing 
consequences from it.• •If a hypothesis is found that, when 
put to the deductive test, consistently resists refutation, 
it is deserving of at least provisional acceptance. " 83 
I think, however, that it is important to modify this 
claim. He states that a hypothesis which consistently 
resists refutation is deserving of "at least provisional 
acceptance," however, using such a method he can truly say 
that such a hypothesis deserves only at best provisional 
acceptance. Such is the nature of any knowledge (excluding 
the Cogito) which is not based upon apriori, or more 
71 
accurately, necessary truths and those truths which can be 
validly deduced from them. 
However, this is not necessarily a criticism, for I 
think that Aune is well aware of what philosophy is reduced 
to if we should accept what he says as true. After all, has 
not the field of psychology done something extremely 
similar? During the past century psychology has tried to 
liberate itself from rationalistic explanations of the 
human being and has turned instead to science as the metho d 
of choice. And what have we witnessed? First of all, in 
prescinding from the "black box" of the mind, many great 
scientific "laws" of behavior have been formulated. No one 
can deny the merits of Skinner's research in the area of 
behavioristic learning, or the incredible advances in the 
understanding of the anatomy and physiology of the brain 
(which has at least demonstrated that the "mindM does not 
exist in the pineal gland) or again, look at some of the 
computer models designed to simulate human reasoning. 
However, while such research sheds great light on many 
issues concerning man, it does not automatically follow 
that the human being is simply a slave to the laws of 
stimulus--response, or that the mind is the brain, or 
that human reasoning is not far richer and more complex 
than any computer simulation. 
Psychology, in my opinion, has fallen into its 
greatest errors precisely when it has tried to reduce 
something which can be known only through a deep intuitive 
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analysis to something which can be empirically validated . 
Such is the case when a study of the nature of love is 
reduced to the mating habits of primates or to the number 
of orgasms a person has during a specified period of time. 
Yet, while we do find such errors occuring, it seems 
that much of the data of psychology lends itself to 
scientific study and cannot be known on the basis of 
insight into necessary essences. Therefore it would be 
wrong to claim that psychology has completely mismatched 
method with datum . 
In the field of sociology we find the opposite event 
taking place. Rather than reducing the object of a 
priori knowledge to the level of the contingent, the 
non-necessary is treated as if it were the necessary 
(although it must be said that a given sociologists may not 
consider morality, for example, to have a necessary 
nature). If not explicitly, at least implicitly, what is 
normal is all too often mistakenly equivocated with what is 
moral. If the vast majority of all teenagers experiment 
with marijuana before leaving junior high, then it is 
normal/moral and thus parents must not be overly 
concerned. 
Philosophy must not make the same mistake of 
mis-matching methods with data. While it is certainly fair 
to assert that philosophical positions should be tested by 
deducing consequences from them, and we must take into 
account all knowledge which is relevant to the issues at 
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stake (even if such knowledge is acquired from a dialogue 
with other fields), it is not fair to reduce a 
philosophical position gained through insight into 
necessary and self - evident states of affairs to a 
hypothesis - a mere educated guess . 
And now we have come to my primary criticism of Aune ' s 
paper. As will be recalled, his main consideration used to 
support his criticism of Chisholm's and Lehrer's responses 
to Moore is that they are not proofs. Even so, he states 
that "Chisholm or Lehrer might wish to make a case for 
their conclusions by claiming that their premisses 
(concerning consistency) are intuitively obvious to them." 
However, he considers this additional step in their 
argument "a pretty idle one•, for "If a perception of 
intuitive obviousness carried any weight, it would also 
accrue to Moore ' s perception that his analysis is 
acceptable on its own merits."84 
We find Aune assuming two things in this paper: first 
that disagreement among philosophers regarding the results 
of insight invalidates insight as a tool for philosophical 
knowledge and argumentation, and second, as mentioned 
earlier, he assumes the truth of the idea that a deductive 
argument cannot have all of its premisses proven by 
deductive reasoning lest we be caught in an infinite 
regress of proofs. For the sake of conciseness, I will 
refer to this insight discovered by Aristotle as the •1aw 
of the infinite regress.• 
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While it is certainly true that a claim of insight is 
not very powerful in an argument (because one is at the 
mercy of the opponent to admit to seeing the truth gained 
by insight), it does not follow that insight is no longer 
valuable as a source of knowledge. On the contrary, it is 
quite necessary, and the fact that there is disagreement 
regarding claims of knowledge gained through insight in no 
way serves as evidence of the validity or invalidity of 
insight as a method of acquiring knowledge; it simply 
necessitates the use of other techniques in conveying 
truths gained through insight. Later in this essay I will 
explore some of these techniques and point to their 
usefulness and their shortcomings . 
As for his second assumption, it seems that he offers 
the law of the infinite regress of deductive proofs as 
something which is intuitively obvious. And if I am correct 
in asserting this, then it seems that he has little reason 
to question the validity of the knowledge gained through 
insight and the deductive method of argumentation can once 
again be used to construct logically rigorous proofs. As a 
consequence, I claim that his hypothetico-deductive method 
does not exclude the traditional method, and further, I 
believe it can be demonstrated that it presupposes the 
traditional method in its epistemological justification. 
It seems to me, that based upon what he has stated in 
his paper, he can respond to this charge in two ways: he 
might claim to be using the law of the infinite regress 
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simply as an "elementary, non-controversial truth•, or he 
might propose that this law is known through the use of the 
hypothetico-deductive method. Yet it seems clear that 
neither of these responses could ever do justice to the 
kind of knowledge we possess in the law of the infinite 
regress. 
I claim that the law of the infinite regress is an 
absolutely necessary truth. It could not be otherwise. And 
it is precisely this feature which allows us to gain an 
insight into the nature of a deductive argument. We need 
not look at many different arguments over a long period of 
time in order to see this truth. It is not a hypothesis 
which has simply resisted refutation throughout history. It 
is not something which has reached the level of a 
scientific inductive law simply because we have noticed 
that it has just happened to hold true of every concrete 
example of a deductive argument. This is an interesting 
feature which is common to all genuine philosophical 
insights. 
Even if we prescind from the actual existence of any 
given deductive argument, ~e are still able to see that for 
any and all deductive arguments the law of the infinite 
regress must hold true. Husserl's notion of epoche made 
reference to this feature of a genuine insight which allows 
us to "bracket• the actual existence of the object under 
consideration, without invalidating what is known about the 
object . 
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Notice, I say all genuine insights. I am forced to say 
this because I do not hold that it is possible to gain an 
insight into the essence of chair. This I would contend, is 
because the chair lacks a necessary unity. 
The fact that a chair possesses a meaningful unity 
allows us to recognize it for what it is. However, there is 
no one feature of a chair which could not be otherwise, 
that is, every individual feature of a chair could be 
thought of as changed without a change occuring in the 
other features. But in the case of a necessary unity, for 
example, a square, perfect justice, or the nature of a 
deductive argument, we find certain properties or 
meaningful relations among their parts which could not be 
otherwise. That is, if the object were to concretely exist, 
these things must hold true in every particular 
exemplification of it. It seems that Plato himself began to 
see the aforementioned distinction in the Parmenides where 
he questions the existence of a form for mud, which at best 
possesses a meaningful unity, and most certainly not a 
necessary one. 
It seems clear that the nature of a deductive argument 
is more like the nature of a square, which is rich in 
necessity and capable of being grasped intuitively, than 
the nature of a chair, which seems to reveal itself only 
thru time, as we enounter more and more actually existing 
chairs. 
The question still remains as to how one is supposed 
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to convey the knowledge gained through insight to another 
while engaged in philosophical argumentation. I think that 
there exist at least three common "verbal helps• which can 
facilitate insight, and while a fair presentation of these 
methods is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to 
briefly mention what they are.as 
The first would be to distinguish the essence under 
consideration from similar things by giving concrete 
examples. An example of this would be distinguishing the 
moral responsibility resulting from manslaughter from the 
moral responsibility which arises from the act of murder. 
A second "verbal help" is to give "so-called" 
definitions. I say "so called" because any definition of 
something which cannot be reduced to something else will 
always be circular. However, it may help facilitate the 
grasping of the nature of an object. An example of this 
would be defining a 'positive value' as "that property of 
an object on account of which its existence is 
intrinsically better than its non-existence.• However, 
while this definition may be helpful, it is circular 
because the term 'intrinsically better' clearly implies a 
positive value judgement. 
Finally, one can point out consequences that the 
insight has which are actually accepted by the other 
person. An example is found when two people agree that the 
definiens and the definiendum of a definition must both 
hold true or both hold false when applied to a given 
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situation. It then seems fair that if a person can 
demonstrate that this is not the case with the definition 
in question, then that definition is not a good one. 
It seems to me that the nature of both freedom and 
what it means to be determined can be known through 
insight. Even while prescinding from the actual existence 
of individual manifistations of freedom and being 
determined, we can see that the two essences are 
necessarily incompatible. However, the proponents of soft 
determinism obviously do not share this insight. Thus, when 
dealing with them one is forced to use some other technique 
to demonstrate what is given by insight. 
I think that Chisholm and Lehrer have given excellent 
examples of how this can be done using what I have 
mentioned as the third •verbal help•. However, Aune would 
say that they beg the question in claiming that their 
suppositions are consistent with Moore's analysans but not 
his analysandum. In response to Aune one could say that 
there are two senses of •being presupposed•, and only one 
of them involves •begging the question.u Fritz Wenisch has 
reminded of the distinction between presupposing something 
in the order of knowledge and presupposing something in the 
order of being. To include among the premisses what is 
contained in the conclusion is to presuppose something in 
the order of knowledge, and this truly is begging the 
question. This Chisholm and Lehrer do not do. However, 
something can also be presupposed in the order of being, 
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meaning that it must be the case. "In general, whenever an 
attempt is made to establish that something is the case, 
what one wishes to establish is presupposed in the sense 
that it actually must be the case prior to the commencement 
of the attempt to establish it; otherwise, it would be 
impossible for the attempt to be successful. There is, 
however, absolutely no logical difficulty connected with 
this fact."86 
It appears to me that, rather than proposing a new 
method for philosophical argumentation, our time would be 
better spent doing an analysis of necessary essences. I 
realize that this presupposes, (in the order of being), the 
existence of essences, however, it seems that even Aune, 
perhaps unknowingly, has presented us with an example in 
which we have gained absolutely certain knowledge of the 
nature of at least one essence - namely the essence of a 
deductive proof. 
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B. CONCERNING BRENTANO'S REISM 
I would now like to look at Brentano's reism, a view 
of reality which excludes the existence of all universals, 
both meaningful unities and necessary essences. This 
critique of Brentano's reism becomes especially relevant to 
phenomenological realism when one considers the fact that 
in his early years, Brentano presented us with many of the 
ideas which 'prepared the soil', so to speak, for 
phenomenology (e.g. the notion of intentionality). 
Referring to Brentano's turn from an extreme realism 
to reism, Chisholm states that, "After 1905, Brentano held 
that, strictly speaking, the only entities that we are 
capable of thinking of are individuals."87 These individual 
things he calls entia realia and included under this 
heading are such things as "Dogs, red things, squares, 
unicorns and mermaids.• Before 1905, it seems that in 
addition to these entia realia Brentano included in his 
ontology entia irrealia. He would include as entia 
irrealia "privations, possibilities, mental entities, 
concepts, properties, states of affairs, and 
propositions.•ss It is interesting to note that Chisholm 
lists red things, squares, unicorns and mermaids in 
Brentano's class of entia realia. Clearly, Brentano did 
not translate entia realia as 'actual or real thing' 
Chisholm suggests that we translate ens reale as 
•individual•, uconcretum• or •thing• and ens irreale as 
"nonindividua1•, •nonconcretum• or "nonthing•.s9 
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Now before proceeding any further, and in order to be 
fair to Brentano, I must make clear a few things. It seems 
that when Brentano was a realist, he was an Aristotelian 
and while I am myself a realist, I am not an Aristotelian. 
I am far more Platonic in my outlook and this will be 
reflected in my understanding of Brentano both before 1905 
and after. I see this as important in two ways and 
unimportant in another. I do not see this as being 
pertinent in the sense that I will be unobjective and 
biased. I say this because my criticisms should be taken at 
face value, if they are true, then they are true and if 
unjustified or false, then they are unjustified or false, 
not biased. However, the fact that I am Platonically 
orientated is pertinent in two senses: (1) I am not very 
familiar with Brentano ' s earlier Aristotelianism and (2) I 
have had a hard time metaphysically imagining what 
Brentano's reistic world would be like - although I do 
think I have some idea of this. Because of these two 
factors, I have relied heavily on Chisholm's interpretation 
of Brentano, which is probably a very accurate and sound 
one. However, while I am almost apologetic about my 
ignorance of Aristotle and B~entano I do not apologize for 
my criticisms of Brentano's reism as I understand it, for 
as I understand it there are a few real problems. 
I will use the following three questions as a guide 
throughout my evalution of reism: (1) Is Brentano's reism 
ontologically compatible with his notion of intrinsic 
-
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value?; (2) Is Brentano's reism epistemologically 
compatible with the way in which he uses language?; and (3) 
Does reality present itself in such a way that would make 
reism plausible or necessary, or rather, does it present 
itself in such a way which would allow us to speak of 
universal properties? 
(1) IS BRENTANO'S REISM ONTOLOGICALLY COMPATIBLE WITH HIS 
NOTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE? 
Let me begin this discussion by saying that I believe 
we are indebted to Brentano for many great 'insights' into 
the nature of intrinsic value and its relation to the 
person. While I disagree with his apparent identification 
of emotions and volitions I do agree with this view of his: 
emotional evaluations are to be judged objectively in a way 
analogous to rational judgements. This view may seem odd to 
some, however, if one views certain objects as possessing 
goodness in and of themselves, then it may be correct to 
love such objects, and similarly, if one views certain 
objects as being bad in and of themselves, then it may be 
incorrect to love such objects. Now then, one might object 
that emotions are not within the full control of the will 
and therefore are amoral, that is ~hey should not be spoken 
of as correct and incorrect. I have two things to say in 
response. Firstly, I do not think that Brentano uses the 
terms correct and incorrect in a moral sense, but rather in 
a sense analogous to judgements of the intellect. Secondly, 
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as pointed out in chapter four, von Hildebrand, who does 
not identify emotions with volitions, speaks of two kinds 
of freedom which we have with regards to emotions: (a) an 
indirect freedom which is demonstrated in the psychological 
phenomenon of a person slowly changing his or her character 
such that more appropriate emotional responses can be given 
and (b) cooperative freedom through which we can either 
sanction or disavow individual emotions and thus create a 
certain "unity" or "distance" between the response and our 
personal center.90 Seen in this light, the idea of 
emotional correctness and incorrectness would not be absurd 
even if we did hold that certain emotional responses, such 
as feeling disgust towards the act of a grown man beating 
an innocent child, are morally required. 
The questions now arise as to what things are 
intrinsically valuable? and are these 'things' to be found 
in a reistic ontology? 
In Chisholm's work we are presented with two 
statements of Brentano's table of values: one formulated 
Oskar Kraus and the other Chisholm presents as something 
which could be drawn "If we follow Brentano.• The first 
list, that is Oskar Kraus' list, includes the following 
objects as intrinsically good: 
every correct judgement and especially every 
judgement that is evident; every correct emotion and 
especially every emotion that presents itself as 
being correct; and also every enrichment of our 
presentational life.91 
The following things are predominantly bad: 
by 
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every error; every sensory pain; every unjustified 
act of hate--especially every act of hate that is 
apprehended as being incorrect, thus primarily the 
hatred of that which is good. Naturally the love of 
that which is bad is also an evil--especially the 
love of that which is apprehended as bad.92 
What immediately jumps out at me when I read this list 
is the blatant ego-centricity of the things both good and 
bad. This becomes particularly evident when one reads the 
following passage by Oskar Kraus: 
Every conscious act as something that is 
self-conscious contains inseparably some 
presentation. Therefore it is essential to every 
mental act that something valuable be given along 
with that act. It follows that there is no evil that 
does not contain some trace of what is good.93 
Notice here, he does not say that there is no presentation 
of evil which does not contain some trace of what is good, 
but rather "there is no evil which does not contain some 
trace of what is good.• It seems clear that in saying this 
he is not referring to some kind of Augustinian notion of 
existence as intrinsically valuable (and therefore all that 
exists, even evil, is good at least to the extent that it 
does exist). No, he is not predicating mere existence as 
being intrinsically good, rather, it seems that he is 
stating that all intrinsic good or evil consists in the 
conscious activity of the subject. I think that apart from 
any criticisms in connection with his reism, this view can 
be criticized for failing to do justice to those objects 
which are intrinsically valuable. After reading Oskar 
Kraus' list I am left wondering: what about all of the 
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objects of judgement, the intentional objects of emotional 
responses and the content of presentations? 
However, this problem is not to be found in Chisholm's 
own list of things which are intrinsically valuable. He 
states that: 
If we follow Brentano, we may make two lists - a list 
of things that are intrinsically good and a list of 
things that are intrinsically bad. The good list 
would include such items as these: pleasure, 
happiness, love, knowledge, justice, beauty, 
proportion, good intention, and the exercise of 
virtue. The bad list, on the other hand, would 
include such items as these: displeasure, 
unhappiness, hatred, ignorance, injustice, ugliness, 
disharmony, bad intention, and the exercise of 
vice.94 
Clearly, this list is much closer to what one would 
expect a list of intrinsically valuable things to look 
like. However, upon reading this list the following 
question gains new force: Is Brentano ' s Reism ontologically 
compatible with his notion of intrinsic value? After all, 
this list reads like a review of Plato's favorite essences 
or forms. Can Brentano speak of •pleasure, happiness, love, 
knowledge, justice, beauty ... the exercise of virtue• etc. 
and not be committed to universal properties? For that 
matter, concerning Oskar Kraus' list we can ask, can 
Brentano exclude mental ent .ities or even more generally, 
can he exclude universals from his ontology and continue to 
speak of judgements, emotions and presentations? But let us 
not get ahead of ourselves. 
Concerning his theory of intrinsic value we must ask 
the following: If only concrete, existing, individual 
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things are knowable, then what kind of object does beauty 
or love become? As stated earlier, after 1905 Brentano no 
longer included mental entities, concepts, properties, 
states of affairs, and propositions in his ontology. So we 
must ask, What kind of objects are these objects which are 
intrinsically valuable? Is there any chance that Brentano 
would claim that in saying love, happiness, and justice are 
intrinsically valuable, he merely means that individual 
existing instances of love, happiness and justice are 
valuable, and nothing apart from these concrete instances 
of love, happiness and justice exists? If he denies that 
this is what he means, then it seems that he is committed 
to universal properties or concepts and must, therefore, 
abandon his Reism. If this is in fact what he means, then 
we are lead to our second central question: 
(2) IS BRENTANO'$ REISM EPISTEMOLOGICALLY COMPATABLE WITH 
THE WAY IN WHICH HE USES LANGUAGE? 
Precisely what we want to ask is this: If the only entities 
that we are capable of thinking of are individual, 
concretely existing things, then am I able to speak 
meaningfully about things like love, happiness or justice? 
Or for that matter, can one speak of judgements, emotions 
and presentations in a general fashion, creating rules 
which seem to cover a whole class of objects without at 
least creating a universal concept? 
Brentano saw that if one holds a reistic view of 
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reality then one should not use predicates in language, for 
predicates claim that a particular object has a certain 
universal property. Chisholm uses this example: 
In saying, "some dogs run• and uA rose is red," we 
use both terms ("dogs• and "rose") and predicates 
("run• and "red"). But we could use only terms and 
dispense with predicates. For example, instead of 
saying, "Some dogs run,• we could say, •some dogs are 
runners"; and instead of saying, "A rose is red," we 
would say, "A rose is a-red-thing."95 
Chisholm states that the original traditional phrasing 
of the latter statement seems to relate a flower to the 
abstact object of redness. However, Brentano's paraphrase 
combines two individuals, a rose and a-red-thing, and these 
two things are related to one another through Brentano's 
modified theory of substance and accident. (We will look 
more closely at Brentano's theory of substance and accident 
later on in this paper when we look for ways in which 
Brentano has tried to avoid some of the problems associated 
with reism.) 
However before asking how Brentano relates these two 
ir .d ividual things we should ask what this means. He has 
paraphrased "Some dogs run• into "Some dogs are runners". 
Now, while I grant that the second sentence certainly 
follows from the first, I will not grant that they are 
equal in meaning. Not only this, but I would say that the 
first sentence is more basic than the second. After all, do 
we say that I run because I am a runner, or rather that I 
am a runner because I run? I think the latter is true. 
Thus, I am called a runner only because 'run' can truly be 
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predicated of me. Think of how funny it would be if someone 
asked me •Jim you had been exercising so well during the 
last month and said that you were feeling much better, so 
why did you stop running?" and in response I stated 
that the reason I stopped running was because I ceased to 
be a runner. I think few people would buy such an answer. 
However, what if we were to allow Brentano to speak in 
the way he does? Let us say for a minute that "a rose is 
a-red-thing• and "some dogs are runners" and at the same 
time keep in mind that only individual, concretely existing 
things are knowable to the human mind. Let us put aside all 
Platonic, Aristotelian and conceptualist notions and try to 
understand just what it would then mean to say •a rose is 
a-red-thing". This is indeed a very difficult task. As a 
matter of fact, I think it is impossible to do. Without the 
knowledge of what redness is, without at least a concept of 
red, I have no idea what it means for anything to be 
a-red-thing. The word 'red' in the term ' a-red-thing' is a 
completely empty word. Where there once was meaning there 
is now only a void. 
There are only two senses in which there is any 
meaning to the term 'a-red-thing' and neither are 
satisfactory. Let us try to picture what would happen in 
the case of someone pointing to a fire truck and saying 
"There!, that is a-red-thing.• I could then attach some 
meaning to the term 'a-red-thing ' , that is, I would think 
of the fire truck. However, if the same person were to 
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point to a ripe apple, and then again at the background of 
~ stop sign, and both times say "There!, that too is 
a-red-thing•, then only one of two things could happen. 
Either I should think that the person is foolish for 
calling three radically different objects by the same name 
and thus fall into an extreme nominalism or else I will 
begin to abstract the property of redness from each of 
these three objects and form a concept of red, thus 
escaping from both nominalism and reism. For Brentano, the 
only choice is an extreme form of nominalism in which we 
may call many different objects ' a-red-thing' but in 
reality there is no reason for doing so, it is not done in 
virtue of some similarity which they share--some property 
or properties common to them both. 
In such an extreme case of nominalism I insist that I 
cannot know what you mean when you say ' a-red-thing' 
because you do not use the word ' red' to denote the 
property redness, rather, for all I know you might be 
saying that it is a porcupine. And for the reader to 
understand what I have just said presupposes that he or she 
knows what I mean by 'porcupine', which in the case of an 
extreme nominalism might mean ice cream. And ice cream etc. 
etc. 
This leads us to our next question: 
(3) DOES REALITY PRESENT ITSELF IN SUCH A WAY THAT WOULD 
MAKE REISM PLAUSIBLE, OR RATHER, DOES IT PRESENT ITSELF IN 
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SUCH A WAY WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO SPEAK OF UNIVERSAL 
PROPERTIES? 
Perhaps before we try to answer this question, we 
should take a look at some of the ways in which Brentano 
has tried to avoid some of the difficulties we have 
encountered concerning the meaning of words. In doing so we 
will notice that the two distinct questions, one concerning 
ontological justification and the other concerning 
epistemological justification, are not so distinct. In 
order to focus upon both intrinsic value and language 
meaning I have tried and will try to keep these questions 
distinct, but this is not to deny that in reality they are 
closely related to one another. For these questions point 
to the intimate relationship between knowledge and its 
object. 
Perhaps the ontological question comes first, for if 
Brentano can point to some metaphysical objects which 
justify his speaking in general terms about things, for 
example his claim that beauty and love are intrinsically 
valuable, then I would never raise questions concerning the 
meaning of such claims. However, it is because words like 
'beauty,' 'love,' and 'justice' point to universal 
properties or at least concepts, and because Brentano fails 
to recognize the existence of these universals, that I must 
raise the question concerning what he means when he uses 
such terms. 
The first clarification Brentano might make would 
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concern the way in which he uses terms like 'beauty, ' 
'love,' or 'justice.' In the first few pages of Chisholm's 
book on Brentano and intrinsic value we find the following 
passage: 
Finally, Brentano's theory has a feature that may 
seem to conflict with what I have called its 
objectivity. He says that the terms 'good', 'bad', 
'better', when used in connection with intrinsic 
value, are all syncategormatic. In holding this, 
Brentano is rejecting the simple theories of value 
predication that were presupposed by G.E. Moore and 
Max Scheler: The word •good," they seemed to say, has 
as its intention a simple quality comparable to 
yellow or blue.96 
By using the term "sycategormatic" Brentano is simply 
saying that the terms 'good', 'bad', 'better' do not 
actually refer to any real object. It seems likely that 
Brentano would say the same thing concerning terms like 
'beautiful, ' 'lovely, ' or 'just. ' 
In response to this passage I would like to say two 
things. The first point is that while Chisholm compares 
Scheler and Moore's theories of the good to theories which 
may perhaps seem plausible with regard to colors such as 
yellow or blue, Brentano's theory would make it necessary 
for him to reject such a •simplistic" theory of colors as 
well. And the question remains as to whether reality 
requires us to reject or support such "simplistic" 
theories. My second point concerning Brentano's idea of 
"syncategormatic" terms is that by calling these terms 
syncategormatic, he only tells us how he is not using them. 
Thus, Brentano merely pushes back the question as to how he 
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actually does use these terms. 
A second way in which Brentano has tried to avoid some 
of the difficulties of reism is through his theory of 
substance and accident--a theory which, by the way, varies 
greatly from the traditional Aristotelian concepts of 
substance and accident. 
Chisholm gives the example of a person who sees a 
tree. "In Brentano's terminology the one who sees a tree is 
an accident of the one who thinks about a tree, and the one 
who thinks about a tree is, in turn, an accident of the 
self or person."97 Therefore , according to Brentano, 
accidents may have accidents. An accident which may have 
another accident is called a substrate, although a 
substrate need not have other accidents or itself be an 
accident. The unique case of a substrate which is not 
itself an accident is called a substance. Further, and 
again in opposition to Aristotle, he claims that the 
relation of accident to substance is not that of the 
accident being a part of or existing in the substance, but 
rather he claims that the substance is a part of the 
accident. Thus Chisholm concludes that "Using the 
terminology of 'part' and 'whole', we may say that, 
according to Brentano, a substance is a thing that can be a 
proper part but cannot have a proper part; an accident is a 
thing that has a substance as a proper part."98 
Now the following shall make clear how he wants to use 
this theory of substance and accident in order to avoid 
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some of the difficulties associated with reism: 
Every substance and every accident is an ens reale, 
according to Brentano. He also says, in effect, 
that every heap, or aggregate, of entia realia is 
itself an ens reale. Such considerations, he 
thinks, remove the apparent need for supposing that 
individual things are related to abstract objects. 
Individual things are related only to other 
individual things.99 
The key to Brentano's proposed solution to the problem 
of apparent predication (which arises from his reism) lies 
in his allowing heaps or aggregates of entia realia to be 
entia realia. As Chisholm has stated, Brentano thinks 
that this will remove the apparent need for relating 
individual things to abstract objects, namely properties or 
concepts. The only way in which I can see him viewing this 
as a solution would be if he were to group only those 
things which have traditionally been said to share a common 
property, for example, my group of 'red-things' - the fire 
truck, the red apple and the background of a stop sign, 
and claim that all of these taken as a group are to be 
considered as ens realia. If he were to create an 
aggregate of things which have never been viewed as sharing 
a common property then this theory does no work for him, 
for what he wants is to relate individual objects not to 
properties but to individual things, namely aggregates, but 
this would appear to work only if the aggregate is composed 
of objects which have in the past been seen as sharing a 
common property. 
Assuming the existence of such an aggregate, he could 
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say that it is this aggregate of individual, concretely, 
~xisting things which he calls intrinsically valuable. For 
example, it might be that all of the concretely existing 
beautiful-things should be taken together to form an 
aggregate and thus earn the title of entia realia. Thus, 
when he would call beauty intrinsically valuable he would 
merely be referring to this 'individual' aggregate. 
However, this has two consequences which may be 
problematic. 
First of all, he could no longer speak of such terms 
as being syncategormatic, for they refer to a really 
existing object, namely the aggregate. However, it is 
questionable as to whether he would speak of beauty as 
intrinsically valuable rather than all beautiful-things. 
While Chisholm does say that "If we follow Brentano" we may 
include beauty in the list of intrinsically good things, it 
is not clear as to whether or not this phrasing would be 
true to Brentano only during his earlier period of 
thinking. However, this criticism would at least hold true 
of what he did state about terms like good, bad and better. 
So we find at least some confusion here concerning how he 
hopes to avoid the problem of apparent predication. On the 
one hand he wants to say that the terms (good, bad, better) 
do not refer to any really existing thing, and this he does 
by calling them syncategormatic terms, and on the other 
hand he wants to say that individual things are related to 
individual things, namely aggregates of those things. 
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The second problem concerning this theory of 
substances, accidents, and aggregates is somewhat more 
central to my criticism of reism. The problem is this: In 
virtue of what does he classify a given number of these 
individual, concretely existing things as belonging to the 
same aggregate? As we have seen earlier, aggregates could 
only begin to get around predication if the members 
composing an individual aggregate were things which were 
traditionally said to possess a common p r perty. In the 
past we would have said that this shared property was 
predicated of the individual concrete things. Brentano 
thinks that we are now merely relating the individual 
concrete thing to another concrete thing, namely the 
aggregate. However, this does nothing to solve the problem 
of reism, it merely pushes it back even further . 
We are justified in wanting to know why he would say 
that all red-things belong in the same aggregate. Is it 
because they are identical? Certainly not. Brentano of all 
people, being a meriological essentialist, would reject 
this. Time and spacial location would suffice to disprove 
this notion. Is it because they are similar? Similar in 
what respect? The similarity certainly could not be that 
they share a common property. 
I can think of no reason why he would include these 
things in the same aggregate. If they are then grouped 
together haphazardly, then there is no reason why I should 
want to relate the individual concrete red-thing to an 
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aggregate of red-things, for they share absolutely nothing 
in common. 
Is this the way it must be? Must we try to avoid 
properties at all costs? I think the answer is no. In what 
follows I will briefly try to show the reader why I think 
Brentano would have been justified had he included 
properties in his ontology. In order to do so we shall 
investigate the nature of two things which Brentano spoke 
of as entia realia, that is, we will look at two things 
which he did include in his ontology and see if we can 
arrive at the existence of universal properties. These two 
objects are red things and squares. 
However, before trying to arrive at universal 
properties, it may be best to look at what is perhaps a 
less controversial solution to reism, namely conceptualism. 
I am convinced that if a person will grant me the real 
existence of red things and squares then I can at least 
force a choice between an extreme and meaningless 
nominalism and conceptualism (and I believe that even 
conceptualism will necessarily lead to either an extreme 
nominalism or a theory of universal properties.) 
As stated earlier, I think that if someone were to 
take me around and point first to a fire truck, then later 
at a ripe apple, and then again at the background of a stop 
sign, and each time say to me - NThere, that is a red 
thing•, then eventually I think one of two things would 
happen. Either I would think the person an idiot for 
----
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calling three radically different things by the same name 
(and acting as if there were something represented by the 
name), or else I would eventually abstract from each of 
these their common property and form a concept of redness 
(and I would then associate the word ' red ' with this 
concept). I think that it is much more likely that the 
latter should happen. It is not the case that the two 
responses on my part are equally justified. If I were to 
fall into an extreme nominalism after such an experience , 
then it would be because I have failed to see something 
which really was there. Conceptualism, however, is 
justified by my experience of the three objects. Each of 
these three objects present themselves as having something 
in common. They share the color red. I can come to know 
this color and its name by associating the presentation of 
red with the name 'red'. Thus, through similar experiences 
of red objects I both expand and refine my concept of red 
and its various shades. 
But I am forced out of conceptualism through the 
following question: In virtue of what have I developed my 
concept of red? Is it not in virtue of seeing the property 
of redness? One might think this absurd and propose that 
rather than seeing the property of redness I have merely 
seen red objects. But I ask again, "in virtue of what are 
these objects called red?" Thus one is forced again to look 
at an extreme nominalism which answers, " In virtue of 
nothing is this object called red, and there is no reason 
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for calling all ' red' objects by the same name for they 
share no common property." The only other alternative is a 
theory which involves universal properties. A theory which 
allows us to say, it is in virtue of the fact that all of 
these objects possess some degree of redness that they are 
all called red. (It is interesting to note that one 
presentation of red is sufficient for me to know the color 
red. Perhaps it would take a few presentations of red while 
being told its name before I would know the color by that 
name, however, it is not the case that I must see red more 
than once in order to know it as such. Abstraction may, 
however, still have its place when we consider that we are 
seldom presented with red as such, but rather with objects 
that possess red accidentally.) 
A further feature which points to universal properties 
is the fact that with regard to objects such as red things 
and squares we find a necessity which could not be known 
through inductive generalization. For example, the 
statement that "orange lies in between yellow and red in 
the order of similarity• is necessarily true. It is in 
virtue of the very nature of the objects of yellow, orange 
and red that this hold true. It is not something to which 
one says that "thus far in every instance that persons have 
encountered these three colors, orange has as a matter of 
fact fallen between yellow and red in the order of 
similarity." It is not merely a matter of fact, it is 
necessarily the case. Anyone who denies this has failed to 
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properly see the nature of these three colors. 
This feature of necessity cannot be accounted for or 
done justice by conceptualistic views or even by 
Aristotelian views of universal properties. For in the 
Aristotelian view, there is no property which exists apart 
from the particulars and thus there is no reason why all of 
the particulars must necessarily possess certain identical 
features. I do not deny that the Aristotelian view of being 
may hold true with regards to certain objects. Such would 
be the case concerning a table. I have witnessed cumbersome 
discussions during which persons have tried to find a 
feature of a table which would necessarily hold of every 
table and at the same time not force us to include floors, 
shelves or animals in our concept of table. I think it is a 
futile excercise, for while there is something meaningful 
about the term 'table,' there is no one feature of a table 
in virtue of which it is a table or put another way around, 
there is no one feature of a table which could not be 
otherwise; that is every individual feature of a table 
could be thought of as changed without a change occuring in 
the other features. But this cannot be said of redness, for 
you could never show me one instance of redness which did 
not meet the criteria of being one of two boundaries '.of 
orange in the order of similarity. If you showed me such a 
color we would not be correct in calling it red . 
The same holds true of squares. Brentano has granted 
that squares are real things. However, he will not grant 
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that there exists a property of Squareness. I should say 
quite the opposite: I am not certain that I have ever seen 
a geometrical figure which had four perfectly equal sides 
which met one another at precisely right angles. However, I 
will claim that necessarily, if such a figure were to 
exist, its diagnals would be of exactly equal length. 
Further, this necessity is not a result of the subject 
containing the predicate, it is not a mere tautology whose 
truth depends upon the way I have defined a square. I need 
not, and perhaps should not speak of a square (for my 
concept of square may contain many ideas), but merely a 
figure with four sides of equal length and which meet at 
right angles. Now when I recognize the fact that the 
diagnals of such a figure must necessarily be of equal 
length, I come to know something both necessary and 
informative, not merely tautological, for the notion of 
diagnals of equal length is not contained in the notion of 
a figure with four sides of _equal length which meet at 
right angles. 
How is such knowledge to be explained? It seems that 
the best answer is found in the view that there exist ideal 
essences, essences which exists regardless of whether or 
not any particulars exemplify them. This is the view of 
reality which I think is justified by reality itself, a 
view which was embraced by both Plato and the many of the 
early phenomenologist. 
Ultimately, Brentano's reism fails to explain why we 
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can speak of certain objects as being intrinsically 
valuable, for it denies the existence of these objects in 
the only form of existence which would justify his claims. 
Further, it renders all language unintelligible, for there 
are no real features or properties in virtue of which I 
call a given class of things by the same name. This leads 
not only to an arbitrariness of language but to complete 
meaninglessness. And lastly, reism fails to do justice to 
the given, to the necessary features of certain highly 
intelligible objects such as the essence Red and the 
essence of Square. 
-
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C. THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT 
I would now like to take a look at the third man 
argument (TMA) as found in the Parmenides. This argument 
is perhaps the most famous argument against the existence 
of Platonic Forms, and curiously enough, it is Plato who 
first introduces the argument. I will briefly review the 
argument and then look at what a few modern writers have 
had to say about it. My response to the TMA leaves open a 
number of questions (particularly with regards to the 
nature of participation), however, the intent of this 
response is merely to familiarize the reader with the TMA 
and show where it fails. 
Recent literature seems to focus upon two main 
questions: (1) Are these arguments destructive to Plato's 
theory of Forms? and (2) Did Plato think they were 
destructive? These questions will guide the following 
discussion; however, in addition to these I think it is 
fair to ask two further questions: (1) If these arguments 
are destructive of the theory of Forms, how, if possible, 
can the theory of Forms be modified to avoid the 
difficulties? and (2) Is Plato correct in his e• 1luation of 
the arguments? 
Recent debate concerning these questions begins with 
G. Vlastos'(1954) •The Third Man Argument in the 
Parmenides•. While this is the article which started a 
whole stream of literature flowing, I much prefer the 
presentation of the argument found in his 1969 article 
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entitled "Plato's 'Third Man ' Argument (Parm. 132A1-B2): 
Text and Logic." Although, I will begin with this text I 
will later return to his 1954 article in order to 
investigate the ontology involved in the TMA and also for 
speculation concerning Plato's state of mind with regards 
to the arguments. Apart from the text itself, I will be 
using Vlastos' two articles (almost exclusively) as the 
basic framework for this discussion. There are two reasons 
for this: I think his interpretation is generally true to 
what Plato has written; and he clearly and concisely 
exposes both the logic and the necessary assumptions of the 
argument (some of which are only implicitly stated in the 
text; therefore his being true to Plato's text is doubly 
important). In the end I shall evaluate both Vlastos' and 
Plato's treatment of the argument and offer my own proposed 
solution to the problem: one which I think avoids the 
regress and can be textually defended. 
I must admit that had anyone other than Plato raised 
the "Third Man Objection• to the theory of Forms I should 
have dismissed it with little thought, for it does not seem 
to me a very good argument. However, Plato does in fact 
present us with this argument, an argument which appears to 
destroy the theory which he has most fervently defended in 
earlier dialogues, and he does so without even the 
slightest attempt to refute the argument. This is indeed 
fascinating. Let us take a look at the text and see what 
sets the stage for the TMA. 
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The Parmenides has one of the most difficult 
settings to recount. It is narrated by Cephalus of 
Clazomenae, who along with some fellow countrymen, 
journeyed to Athens. Upon arriving in Athens, Cephalus 
finds his friend Adeimantus, whose half-brother Antiphon 
lives nearby and can tell the story of the great discussion 
and arguments between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides. It 
seems that Antiphon himself learned the story from 
Pythodorus who was a companion of Zeno and a witness of the 
event. So what we have is Plato, writing a 'dialogue' in 
which Cephalus narrates a story learned from Antiphon who 
himself only heard it from Pythodorus who actually 
witnessed the occurence. This is certainly an interesting 
setting. 
One other background note perhaps worth mentioning is 
the fact that according to the story, Parmenides was quite 
grey and distinguished looking, perhaps sixty-five, Zeno, 
his favor ·i te companion, was about forty, and Socrates was 
then quite young. 
This point may perhaps be insignificant, but I think 
that it could be interpreted as significant in two 
different ways. Plato has removed this story as far as 
possible from himself. Also, he has portrayed Socrates as 
being quite young. It is possible that Plato has at all 
costs tried to avoid making Socrates, his teacher, look 
unduly bad. His error can be blamed on youth, and further 
this story is recounted only through a long chain of 
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persons. Thus, the first interpretation would be that Plato 
has intentionally tried to avoid the scenerio of his great 
teacher in old age being presented with arguments which 
would appear to undo much of his life's work. 
However, a second, and admittedly less probable 
explanation would be the following: If we suppose that 
Plato would like us to take the chronology found in this 
dialogue seriously, then it would hold true that Socrates 
continued to teach and defend the theory of forms long 
after his discussion with Parmenides. Thus , it could be 
Plato's way of stating that he did not consider the 
argument to be destructive to the theory. 
The third man argument in the Parmenides takes two 
forms. The first version of the argument is commonly 
referred to as the Largeness Regress (132a-b) and the 
second version deals with a regress of Ideas as Paradigms 
(132d-133a). Because of the brevity of this paper I would 
like to focus upon only the first of the two versions. 
Little will be lost, for the logic and analysis of the 
first will, with minor alterations, hold true of the second 
version as well and neither of the arguments present a 
unique problem, but rather, they present the same problem 
in two different ways. 
I will give the first version of the argument in three 
quotes: Q.A; Q.B; and Q.C. Thus, the reader can easily be 
referred to the corresponding sections of text when we 
begin to formally analyze the argument. 
way: 
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Parmenides sets up the problem as he sees it in this 
a.A: I suppose you think that each character is one for 
some reason as this: when some plurality of things 
seem to you to be large, there perhaps seems to be 
some one characteristic that is the same when you 
look over them all, whence you believe that the 
large is one.100 
Socrates of course agrees with this. After all, what 
Parmenides has suggested merely points to what has been 
explictly stated in many of Plato's middle dialogues, 
namely, that there exist forms or ideal essences for things 
like beauty, goodness, the equal and so forth. However, 
Parmenides quickly moves on to something which it seems 
Socrates has never considered before. 
Q.B: What about the large itself and the other larges? If 
with your mind you should look over them all in like 
manner, will not some one large again appear, by 
which they all appear to be large?101 
This is the crucial part of the argument. Parmenides 
has just asserted that in using Socrates' criterion for 
formulating the existence of an ideal character, another 
character just like it must necessarily come into 
existence. This section of the argument is going to be the 
focus of our analysis, for Socrates has granted to 
Parmenides that what is asserted seems to be the case and 
although Parmenides has not yet pointed to an infinite 
regress, the regress has already begun. Beginning with the 
existence of one Form, Parmenides has arrived at the 
existence of two Forms. However, let us allow Parmenides to 
draw out the conclusion himself: 
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Q.C: Therefore, another character of largeness will have 
made its appearance alongside largeness itself and 
the things that have a share of it; and over and 
above all those, again, a different one, by which 
they will all be large. And each of the characters 
will no longer be one for you, but unlimited in 
multitude.102 
The three quotes, Q.A, Q.B, and Q.C, taken together 
comprise the famous third man argument. It is a suprisingly 
short argument and extemely astonishing, for Socrates 
objects to neither the premises nor the conclusion even 
though the argument appears to destroy his theory of Forms. 
However, there is more to the argument than meets the eye, 
and perhaps after looking at Vlastos' analysis of the 
argument we will have a better idea of why Socrates might 
agree that an infinite regress would follow from his theory 
of Forms. Then we will judge for ourselves. 
Vlastos (1969) has aimed at stripping the argument 
bare of all rhetorical and stylistic garnishings in order 
to expose the basic premises. The first step, however, is 
to present the theory which is under attack. The theory of 
Forms could be stated as follows: 
1. If any set of things share a given character then 
there exists a unique Form corresponding to that 
character; and each of these things has that 
character by participating in the Form.103 
This is the theory which Parmenides attributes to 
Socrates and Socrates agrees that this is in fact how he 
views reality. A formal representation of this would be: 
Given that: 
1a) a,b, and care F, (that is, there is a set of 
particulars a,b,c, all of which participate in a 
-
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common character F), 
it follows that, 
1b) There exists a unique Form (which we may 
call'F-ness') corresponding to the character, F, and 
a,b,c are F by participating in F-ness. 
Part 1 corresponds with the part of the text which I 
presented as O.A. Vlastos now moves on to formulate the 
crucial part of the argument which is found in O.B. 
Remember that it is in this section that Parmenides begins 
the regress. 
2. If a,b,c, and F-ness are F, then there exists a 
unique Form (which we may call "F-ness2•) 
corresponding to F, but not identical with F-ness; 
and a,b,c, and F-ness are F by participating in 
F-ness2.104 
Now Vlastos argues that in order for Socrates to agree 
with this hypothetical statement he must be assuming 
something which is not made explicit in the argument. 
"Socrates must be assuming what I have called 
'self-predication,' 
SP= The Form corresponding to a given character 
itself has that character."105 
Given SP, 1a, and 1b, it follows that: 
2a. a,b,c, and F-ness are F 
Thus we have the antecedent to 2. However, the 
consequent still does not follow. That is, even if we were 
to say that the Form of a character itself possessed that 
character, why should it be necessary to posit the 
existence of a second Form? Vlastos argues, and I think 
correctly, that Socrates must be making a further 
109 
assumption which he calls Non-Identity (NI). 
"NI= If anything has a given character by 
participating in a Form, it is not identical with 
that Form."106 
It is only with this second tacit assumption that 
Socrates must be committed to the existence of an F-ness2. 
Thus, given 1, 2a, and NI, we necessarily arrive at: 
"2b There exists a unique Form (which we may call 
F-ness2), corresponding to F, but not identical with 
F-ness; and a,b,c, and F-ness are F by participating 
in F-ness2."107 
What follows in Q.C. is merely a repetition of what 
has happened above. If we take a,b,c, F-ness, and F-ness2 
together we will recognize that they also share the same 
character. This, taken together with the principle of 
Non-Identity, leads us to posit the existence of yet 
another Form, F-ness3. And the same can be done with 
F-ness3 and F-ness4, and so forth. Thus Parmenides has used 
the Third Man Argument to arrive at an infinite regress of 
Forms . In Parmenides' own words "If only one, then 
many.•1oa 
Now that we have seen the argument both in its textual 
form and in a more formalized form I think we can try to 
judge whether or not it is actually destructive to the 
theory of Forms. Of course, if we find that the argument is 
invalid or unsound then we will not consider it destructive 
to the theory. 
It seems clear that the most questionable premise of 
the whole argument is the Non-Identity assumption. Without 
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NI, Parmenides would be unable to derive the consequent of 
2 and would therefore not have been able to start the 
regress. 
Not only is NI going to lead to undesirable 
consequences for Plato but in addition to this it is quite 
inconsistent with the two other premises denoted as 1 and 
SP. Both Sellars and Strang have noted this and it can 
easily be shown: 
If, 
and, 
1. If a,b,c, are F then there exists F-ness (a form 
which corresponds to F, and a,b,c are F by 
participating in F-ness.) 
SP= F-ness has the character F 
then we could hardly say that, 
NI= If anything is F by participating in a Form, it 
is not identical with that Form. 
For it would then follow that 
F-ness =/= F-ness.109 
Now concerning the fact that 1, SP and NI form an 
inconsistent triad, Vlastos is in agreement with Sellars 
and Strang. However, this is where they part. 
Perhaps we should begi~ with the Sellars-Strang 
analysis. While Sellars and Strang have written 
independently they have both said the following in 
different ways. Namely, that once we have realized that 1, 
SP, and NI form an inconsistent triad we can easily correct 
the argument so that it works as a valid argument. 
-
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Specifically, all we need to do it substitute "a unique 
Form• in 1 with "at least one Form•. Thus, 1 becomes: 
"1'. If a number of things share a given character, 
then there exists at least one Form corresponding to 
that character; and each of those things has that 
character by participating in that form.•110 
Now there is no doubt that this would create an 
internally consistent argument, however, Vlastos asks the 
key question: would it be the one in the text, the one we 
are supposed to be analyzing? In response he answers No, 
and again I would have to agree with him. All we have to do 
is return to Q.A. and see how the argument is begun in 
order to realize that Socrates held that there exists one 
Form and only one Form. Vlastos defends this view by making 
reference to many other passages of Plato as well: the 
Republic 476a, 5O7b, 596a; Parmenides 131a8-9, 132b5, 
and 132c3-4. It seems fair to say that while the 
Sellars-Strang interpretation of the argument would yield 
an internally consistent argument, it is not t~ -, same 
argument we find in the Parmenides nor is it one that Plato 
would be likely to formulate elsewhere. 
I would like to step back in time and take a look at 
what conclusions Vlastos came to in 1954 concerning the 
crucial point of argument. Vlastos has argued that rather 
than the full-strength Non-Identity assumption, Plato could 
have asserted a modifided version of NI which I will call 
NI I. 
NI'= "If any particular has a certain character, 
then it cannot be identical with the Form in virtue 
of which we apprehend that character. If xis F, x 
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cannot be identical with F-ness when, and only when, 
the values for x are particulars, a,b,c ... •111 
This seems to me to be an obvious solution to the 
problem. Why is it that Socrates did not object to 
Parmenides by making explicit that this is all that is 
assumed? Vlastos' response to this is interesting. Vlastos 
asserts that Plato, at the time of writing the Parmenides, 
was in a state of honest perplexity. Quite frankly Plato 
was baffled by this argument. Why? 
Vlastos tries to show why he thinks this is the case 
and in doing so he investigates the question as to whether 
Plato's theory of Forms entails the two tacit assumptions, 
(SP and NI), which are necessary to produce the infinite 
regress. Two further ideas which are found throughout the 
writings of Plato must now be made explicit. The first is 
the Doctrine of Separation. In the Parmenides at 130b, we 
find the following: •Tell me, Socrates, have you yourself 
drawn this division you speak of: on the one hand, certain 
Forms separately by themselves and, on the other, 
separately, the things which partake of them?• This 
separation of the Form from its particulars is a key idea 
and sheds some light on the problem of Forms. 
The second idea which must be made explicit is Plato's 
notion of being. Vlastos states that for Plato, to say 'x 
is', in the strict sense of is, entails that: 
i ) xis intelligible 
ii) xis changeless 
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iii} xis not qualified by contrary predicates 
iv} xis itself the perfect instance of the property 
of relation which the word for 'x' connotes. 
Pertaining to this notion of being, the following 
point must be made. We clearly see that (iv}, the idea that 
the Form is the perfect exemplication of the property, 
pressupposes the notion of Self-Predication. So, if Vlastos 
is correct, Plato's very notion of being entails SP. 
Concerning Vlastos' Doctrine of Separation, the 
following two points must be made: First, Forms are 
separated from particulars in that Forms have a higher 
degree of being and reality. This notion is referred to as 
Plato's Degree of Reality Theory. Vlastos quotes the 
Republic when he states that according to Plato particulars 
are 'between the purely real and the t otally unreal.' 
The second point concerning the Separation theory is 
that, if Vlastos is correct in holding that the separation 
of Forms from particulars occurs due to the Degree of 
Reality theory, then I think Plato failed to recognize the 
distinction between differences in degree of reality 
between beings of the same kind, and differences in kind 
of being. That is, according to Vlastos' interpretation of 
Plato, the Separation which exists between Forms and 
particulars is due strictly to a difference in degree of 
being and not in kind of being, but I would suggest that 
Forms and particulars possess different kinds of being. 
Vlastos tries to use this notion of Degrees of Reality 
>----
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to demonstrate why he thinks Plato is going to be committed 
to the assumption of Non-Identity. 
For if the Form, Largeness, is superlatively large, 
while large mountains, oaks, etc., are only 
deficiently large, it must follow that the single 
word, 'large' , stands for two distinct predicates: 
a) the predicate which attaches to the large 
particulars; b) the predicate which attaches to 
Largeness. Call a) 'large' and b) 'large1 ' . Now 
since Largeness is, by hypothesis, the Form of the 
predicate 'large', it cannot be the Form of the 
different predicate 'large1'. There must then be two 
Forms, Largeness and Largeness1 and the 
full-strength form of the Non-Identity Assumption 
becomes unavoidable: not only can no large 
particular be identical with the Form, Largeness, in 
virtue of which it is seen as large, but Largeness 
itself cannot be identical with the Form, 
Largeness 1, in virtue of which we see that it is 
Large.112 
Now I would like to make clear just what Vlastos is 
saying and then show where I think Vlastos has made a 
mistake in drawing the conclusion that NI follows from such 
assumptions. What he is basically saying is this: 
Given the following three ideas: 
1) the F.orm is separated from its particulars 
(Separation), 
2) this separation is due to a difference in degree of 
b eing rather than a difference in kind of being (Degrees 
of Reality Theory), and 
3) there is a Form, F-ness, which is to a high degree F, 
while the particulars a,b, etc. are to a lesser degree F 
then it must follow that, the single wor d , 'F', stands for 
two distict predicates: a) 'F' for the F particulars and b) 
'F1' for F-ness which is itself highly F. Now since F-ness 
is the Form of the predicate 'F', it cannot be the Form of 
the different predicate 'F1'. There must then be two Forms, 
-
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F-ness and F-ness1, and the full-strength version of the 
~on-Identity Assumption becomes unavoidable. 
Now he states that it is "the same reasoning which 
compelled the 'separation' of any F particular from its 
corresponding Form, F-ness, (that) also compels the 
'separation' of any Form from itself, and splits off F-ness 
from F-ness1 ." But this is not necessarily the case. 
Vlastos, I think, rightly sees that Plato erred in 
separating the Form from the particulars in the way in 
which he did. That is, Plato was correct when he saw that 
the Form of a property should be separated from the 
particulars which exemplify the property, but he erred in 
separating them based upon a difference of Degrees of 
Reality rather than upon their real difference in kind of 
existence. 
That they differ in being is seen by the fact that we 
know the particulars through empirical means but we know 
the Forms through their intelligibility. However, we do not 
want to point to a difference in kind concerning the 
property predicated, for we predicate of both the Form and 
the particulars some degree of participation in the 
necessary features of the property; the Form is the 
essence of the property, whereas the particulars 
participate in the property only to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
So we can say this: Plato was justified in separating 
the Form from the particulars. Further, this separation is 
-
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central to his theory of Forms and it is explicitly found 
in his texts. However, a separation should not have occured 
due to a difference of degree it should have happened due 
to a difference of kind. 
It certainly is understandable that Vlastos would 
assume that with regard to another difference of degree, 
this time the degree to which an object exemplifies a 
property, Plato would also make a separation. However, I 
would argue that it is highly unlikely that Plato would 
make the same mistake here. Firstly, Plato confused his 
justification for making a separation with regards to Forms 
and particulars - but he was justified. With regards to the 
separation of a property from itself he is not justified. 
It is not a matter of doing a justifiable act for the wrong 
reason, it is not a justifiable act. Second, if the degree 
to which an object exemplifies a given property were 
sufficient reason for creating a separation, then this 
separation would result in an infinite regress not only of 
the Form, but there would also exist as many properties to 
be predicated as the various particulars which exemplify 
the property to differing degrees. That is, in the example 
Vlastos gave concerning Largeness, not only would there 
exist a separate property 'Large' and 'Large1 ', one for the 
particulars and one for the Form Largeness, but there would 
also exist a separate property ~or both the large mountain 
and the large oak for they differ in degrees of largeness. 
Plato would not make this mistake. 
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It seems that Vlastos has done us a great service in 
exposing the logic of the argument, the two hidden 
assumptions (SP and NI), and the metaphysical theories 
which lie in the background of the argument. However, I do 
not think he has convincingly shown us how Plato, whether 
knowingly or unknowly, was committed to the t heory of 
Non-Identity. 
Thus, it is still a mystery as to why he did 
apparently allow the Non-Identity assumption to be used. 
For with Vlastos I wholly agree that Non-Identity a 
necessary assumption if the argument is to lead to a 
regress, and further, that the NI assumption could easily 
have been modified to exclude the Non-Identity of a Form 
with itself. Where we disagree is whether or not some of 
Plato's other ideas account for an 'unconscious' and 
unstated commitment to, and acceptance of the Non-Identity 
assumption. 
Vlastos has argued that Plato was in an honest state 
of perplexity because he was not explicitly aware of his 
own assumptions, which is possible considering the 
complexity of the assumptions and the diverse metaphysical 
implications of these assumptions, (and Plato never did 
explicitly state some of the most important assumptions). I 
will not argue either for or against this, only Plato 
himself can decisively settle the issue. Thus, I myself am 
still in an honest state of perplexity with regards to how 
Plato viewed the argument. 
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However, before concluding, I would like to state in 
my own words what I thought about the TMA before reading 
Vlastos' articles and what I still think to this day. As 
you will note, much of it parrallels Vlastos' view - only 
it is put much more simply and it ends the argument much 
sooner by clarifying what assumptions 1 and SP should be, 
(and thus, the notion of participation which is found in NI 
would serve to exclude F-ness from the regress). 
Why is it that we speak in terms of Forms at all? 
Melling states that "when different things share the same 
name they do so in virtue of there being something to which 
the common name refers."113 This cuts to the heart of the 
issue. Clearly, when you speak of many different particular 
x's you can't say that you recognize the individual to 
be an x in virtue of itself, for this would not explain 
how you recognize the other x's as x's or why you would 
want to call them all x when they differ as they do. 
However, the Form x can be recognized as being x 
without problems. This is because it is one, it is not many 
differing x's, it can be recognized as being x in 
virtue of itself. We could even define a Form of x as 
follows: 
The Form of x = df. that x which can be recognized as 
x in virtue of itself, that is, without making reference 
to any other object. 
Hence, Vlastos' assumptions 1 and SP would be 
clarified so as to exclude the Form of x from any notion 
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of participation, and in such a way the Form would escape 
Non-Identity, even without changing the Non-Identity 
assumption. 
Along with this, and as a correction to Plato's 
theory, we might add that we should not speak of Forms 
which exist independently of the particulars with regards 
to concepts which are purely relational such as equality, 
similarity, or largeness. Further, it may be helpful to 
speak of certain Forms as being wholly embodied in all the 
particulars which exemplify the Form. Examples of such 
forms would be Personhood or Time. 
In formulating such a notion of Forms, I think we can 
avoid the TMA and at the same time be true to the heart of 
Plato's doctrine. 
It must be admitted that this response has not proven 
the existence of Platonic Forms, (although many 
phenomenological realists think this can be done). However, 
I do hope that while demonstrating where the famous Third 
Man Argument fails, I have also helped to clarify the true 
nature of the genuine essences which are the primary focus 
of chreontic philosophy. 
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